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The Enforcement of Shareholder 




Despite the numerous legal reforms of recent decades, the development of legal rules 
continues to be one of the central problems in Russia and the other “following” countries. 
This problem is aggravated by the fact that the corporate sector develops rather rapidly, as 
globalization, international competition, open markets, and arbitration between regulatory 
regimes enables businesses to learn, borrow and use foreign practices. Because “Western-
style” contracting techniques are well developed and effective, there are strong incentives 
and temptations for private actors from “following” countries and their consultants to    
adapt foreign experience. A common feature in these countries is that modern business 
practices, and sometimes new fragmented statutory rules, encounter enforcement issues       
in local courts.1 
Within a relatively short period after the adoption of basic laws concerning different 
business models, juridical persons in Russia began to enter into shareholder agreements, 
which were not regulated by Russian laws. Such agreements allow for the detailed regulation 
of relations between shareholders in cases where legislative provisions are deemed to be    
not sufficient or not appropriate. From an economic perspective – given dynamic moral 
hazard and uncertainty – shareholder agreements permit the pursuit of efficiency-driven      
ex ante decisions with regard to investments in the firm by enhancing certainty in relations 
and mitigating relational-specific moral hazard issues.2 The contractual arrangements of 
shareholders in companies and joint ventures can also induce the parties to negotiate and 
                                                        
∗ PhD researcher, Tilburg University Tilburg Law School; кандидат юридических наук, 2009, National 
Research University Higher School of Economics (HSE) Faculty of Law, Moscow; LL.M. 2012, Tilburg University 
Tilburg Law School. E-mail: s.gomtsyan@tilburguniversity.edu 
1 For the issues related with the enforcement of shareholder agreements in the Ukraine, see Timur Bondaryev 
and Markian Malskyy, “Recent Developments Concerning Dispute Resolution of Shareholder Agreements        
in Ukraine: For Better or For Worse?”, Stockholm International Arbitration Review, no. 3 (2008), pp. 83-95. The   
pitfalls of implementing United States venture capital contracting techniques in South Korea are described in 
Eugene Kim, “Venture Capital Contracting under the Korean Commercial Code: Adopting U.S. Techniques in 
South Korean Transactions”, Pacific Rim Law and Policy Journal, XIII (2004), pp. 439-470. Brazilian legislation    
also causes problems for private equity and venture capital contracting structures. See Cinthia Daniela Bertan 
Ribeiro, “Financial Contracting Choices in Brazil: Does the Brazilian Legal Environment Allow Private Equity 
Groups to Enter into Complex Contractual Arrangements with Brazilian Companies?”, Law and Business Review 
of the Americas, XIII (2007), pp. 355-380. 
2 Gilles Chemla, Michael A. Habib and Alexander Ljungqvist, “An Analysis of Shareholder Agreements”,  
Journal of the European Economic Association, V (2007), pp. 94, 116. 
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continue relations if deadlock situations arise.3 Finally, shareholder agreements provide       
an opportunity to engage in an efficiency-based choice between rules and standards for      
the better-informed participants of corporate relations rather than legislatures.4 
This new practice of Russian private actors – borrowed from foreign jurisdictions –
encountered enforcement problems in Russian arbitrazh courts (which consider economic  
and certain administrative cases) because some provisions of shareholder agreements were 
considered to be invalid by reason of their incompatibility with the basic requirements of    
the law and the internal documents of companies. This situation, in effect, transformed 
shareholder agreements governed by Russian law into nothing more than a gentlemen’s 
agreement between the parties. The result was the extensive use of other functionally 
equivalent instruments that achieved similar outcomes, and a shift to foreign law as the 
applicable law of such agreements. 
However, these new practices created additional costs for private actors in the form of   
tax obligations, obtaining foreign legal services, and litigation in foreign jurisdictions and 
international arbitration tribunals. In cases where the assets of the parties were in Russia, 
problems arose related to the recognition and enforcement of the decisions and awards        
by Russian courts. Moreover, the fact that substitute techniques could easily circumvent   
legal restrictions necessitated legislative action. Additional concerns were related to the     
loss of national sovereignty over the regulation of corporate transactions and adjudication    
of disputes, and to the interests of local law firms, which had conceded a large part of          
the legal services market in the field of corporate law to the offices of foreign law firms in 
Moscow and St. Petersburg. 
In late 2008 and in the summer of 2009 the legislature responded to this problem              
by amending the Federal Laws on Limited Responsibility Societies5 and on Joint-Stock 
Societies6 respectively and introducing the concept of shareholder agreements in Russian  
law. However, anecdotal evidence suggests that the use of foreign law (especially English 
law) as the applicable law of shareholder agreements remains widespread. This raises two 
questions. First, is the new Russian model of shareholder agreements different from the 
analogous concept used in English law? And second, if the two models are not significantly 
different, what other factors may explain the refusal to use Russian law as the applicable    
law to govern shareholder agreements and instead to prefer English law? 
The objective of this study is to demonstrate the essential similarities and differences       
of the Russian and United Kingdom approaches towards shareholder agreements by 
comparing the treatment of the principal “controversial” provisions of shareholder 
agreements (from the perspective of their enforcement in Russian arbitrazh courts) in the    
two  jurisdictions,  and to  define a  general  framework  that  can be used by Russian arbitrazh  
                                                        
3 Joseph A. McCahery and Erik P.M. Vermeulen, Corporate Governance of Non-Listed Companies (2008), p.            
149 (however, these contractual arrangements are difficult to devise ex ante due to information asymmetries; 
another issue is the valuation of shares for the purposes of buy/sell-out clauses). 
4 The problems of collective decision-making and agency relationships inherent in public legislatures make     
the choice of contractual structures (precise rules versus standards) by legislatures less efficient, than the choice 
made by the better informed participants of corporate relations. See Louis Kaplow, “Rules Versus Standards:  
An Economic Analysis”, Duke Law Journal, XLII (1992), pp. 608–611. 
5 Federal Law “On Limited Responsibility Societies”, as amended; СЗ РФ (1998), no. 10, item 785; transl. in   
W.E. Butler, Russia & The Republics: Legal Materials (loose-leaf service; 2006). 
6 Federal Law “On Joint-Stock Societies”, as amended; СЗРФ(1996), no. 1, item 1; transl. in Butler, note 5     
above. 
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courts to interpret statutory rules on shareholder agreements. To strengthen the normative 
dimension of legal comparisons, the study also applies economic reasoning to construct      
the general framework. 
This study examines the ways in which Russian and English law deal with the relations 
that arise in connection with the agreements between the shareholders of companies with 
regard to the internal governance of the companies and the exercise of the shareholder   
rights over the participatory shares and stocks and certified by the stocks. The comparative 
analysis is multilayered. The first layer includes legal rules on shareholder agreements. 
Because the common law plays a significant role in regulating contracts in the United 
Kingdom, and statutory rules obtain their meaning through their interpretation by courts, 
both statutory and case law are here considered (though Russian cases on shareholder 
agreements are few and almost non-existent after the amendments of the legislative 
provisions concerning shareholder agreements). The second layer is the legal context of       
the rules: other rules, institutions, and branches of law that affect the application of the    
rules. The third layer is the non-legal context: institutional, social, and historical factors      
that affect the development and application of legal rules. 
The choice of English law for comparison is based on the alleged extensive use of the 
latter as the applicable law for shareholder agreements related to Russian companies.             
A recent survey by a leading Russian law firm demonstrated that more than half of the 
Russian companies responding do not trust Russian law and that not more than 10%             
of their significant transactions were made subject to Russian law. Transactions such as 
mergers and acquisitions, shareholder agreements, project financing, joint ventures, and   
debt restructuring are usually structured according to foreign, and mainly English, law.7 
In a comparative analysis it is a challenge to define a neutral research question. One of the 
main methodological problems of this study was the definition of shareholder agreements    
in abstract non-legal terms because these agreements contain different provisions. For the 
purposes of this study a shareholder agreement is an agreement concerning the internal 
governance of the company, rights certified by the shares (or stocks), and/or concerning 
special rules on the of issuing and transferring shares (or stocks). However, the definition      
is not fully neutral,  being based on such legal terms as internal governance, rights certified 
by stocks, and the transfer and issuance of shares or stocks. But because this concept has  
been borrowed by Russian private actors from abroad, rather than developed domestically, 
the agreements have a similar meaning in both England and Russia. This common origin 
allows a common basis and clear scope for comparison to be established. 
The study shows that both jurisdictions share significant similarities in the way they    
deal with the main issues of the enforcement of shareholder agreements (relations with 
imperative statutory rules and articles of association, the participation of the company in        
a shareholder agreement, specific performance of shareholder agreements, external effects    
of a breach of shareholder agreements). Yet, a narrow focus on the main questions of the 
treatment of shareholder agreements by courts is misleading because such a focus only  
shows a part of the big picture. The rules on shareholder agreements should be examined 
within the framework of corporate and contract law in general. 
                                                        
7 Dmytri Afanasiev, «Суверенитет на 10%» [Sovereignty over 10%], Ведомости [Gazette], 27 June 2012. See  
also Hiroshi Oda, “Shareholders’ Agreements in Russia”, International Company and Commercial Law Review, XXI 
(2010), p. 359. 
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The general imperative nature of Russian corporate law as compared with United 
Kingdom company law, uncertainty with regard to the interpretation of the new rules by 
Russian courts, and well-developed supplementary techniques and contract case law in the 
United Kingdom make shareholder agreements governed by English law more convenient, 
and hence, probably, in greater demand. Possibly other factors such as the interests of legal 
advisers, network effects, and the popularity of English law and the English language in 
international commercial transactions affect the choice of the applicable law of shareholder 
agreements. However, the development of case law oriented towards the balancing of the 
rights and interests of the parties from the perspective of the framework offered in this   
article may contribute to more agreements being made subject to Russian law. 
The article will proceed as follows. First, a brief historical background of the development 
of the concept of shareholder agreements in Russian corporate practice and corporate law 
will be provided. Next the first research issue is raised, and the article will address the 
principal “controversial” provisions used by the Russian corporate sector in shareholder 
agreements and will analyze their legality and enforcement under the new approach of 
Russian law and of English law. The third part will use the comparative analysis to explain 
the extensive use of English law by shareholders of Russian companies. Finally, the results   
of the analysis will be used to define a general framework that can be used by Russian   
courts to interpret the new provisions on shareholder agreements introduced in the Law      
on Joint-Stock Societies and the Law on Limited Responsibility Societies. 
RISE OF SHAREHOLDER AGREEMENTS IN 
RUSSIAN CORPORATE PRACTICE 
Shareholder agreements (hereinafter the term encompasses both stockholder agreements 
concluded among stockholders of a joint-stock society and shareholder agreements 
concluded by participants in a limited responsibility society) are among the most      
discussed “private legal transplants” in Russian corporate practice. They were borrowed     
by private actors from foreign practice8 and used without special legal regulation and case 
law.9 However, the decisions of the courts in the Megafon case, which involved the first 
stockholder agreement dealt with by Russian courts, rang a bell for Russian companies, 
stockholders and their consultants. The courts declared the agreement between the          
major stockholders of Russian mobile operator Megafon void.10 In its decision the Federal 
Arbitrazh Court of the West-Siberian Region stated that agreements between stockholders 
cannot be contrary to national legislation and the constitutive documents of juridical   
persons. 
                                                        
8 See Igor Ostapets and Aleksei Konovalov, «Соглашения акционеров в практике совместных    
предприятий с российским участием» [Stockholder Agreements in the Practice of Joint Enterprises with 
Russian Participation], Слияния и поглощения [Mergers and Acquisitions], no. 1-2 (2006), p. 50. 
9 See Ilia Nikiforov and Ilia Bulgakov, «Соглашение между акционерами в российском праве: есть ли 
альтернатива?» [Stockholder Agreements in Russian Practice: Is There an Alternative?], Корпоративный 
юрист [Corporate Jurist], no. 11 (2006), p. 27. 
10 Decision of the Federal Arbitrazh Court of West-Siberian Region, 31 March 2006, No. Ф04-       
2109/2005(14105-А75-11), Ф04-2109/2005(15210-А75-11), Ф04-2109/2005(15015-А75-11), Ф04-2109/2005(14744-
А75-11), Ф04-2109/2005(14785-А75-11). The court of cassation upheld the decisions of the first instance and 
appellate courts. The Supreme Arbitrazh Court of the Russian Federation did not review the judgments. 
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In particular, the courts declared invalid the provisions of the stockholder agreement   
that did not comply with the imperative rules of the Law on Joint-Stock Societies, such          
as the clauses changing the terms for convening general and extraordinary meetings              
of stockholders, the terms of notification about general meetings, requirements on the 
quorum for general meetings, questions that within the exclusive competence of the     
general meeting of stockholders, the rules of electing board members and managers,            
the clauses restricting voting rights on the general meetings of stockholders, the clauses 
establishing pre-emption rights for buying stocks in an open joint-stock society, as well as 
restrictive covenants imposing non-competition obligations on the stockholders.11 
In fact, the only provision of shareholder agreements that did not cause significant 
problems with regard to legality was voting agreements.12 However, these clauses were 
considered as not in force at the enforcement stage. According to the Law on Joint-Stock 
Societies (Article 49), a resolution of the general meeting of stockholders can be disputed        
if the resolution has been adopted in violation of legislation and the company charter. 
Therefore, breaching obligations enshrined in a stockholder agreement cannot be a            
legal ground for overturning the resolution of the general meeting of stockholders. The 
enforceability of specific performance of obligations (a court direction to vote in specific   
way) also was not available. The only available remedies in such cases could be found in     
the law on obligations, namely by claiming damages or penalties.13 
In general response to problems with the legality and enforceability of shareholder 
agreements, Russian corporate practice shifted to the law of foreign jurisdictions. To        
avoid international private law restrictions on the lex societatis and public policy concerns     
in Russian courts,14 instead of providing that the shareholder agreements of Russian 
companies were subject to foreign law, shareholders usually established special purpose 
vehicles in foreign jurisdictions and entered into agreements at the level of these foreign 
juridical persons (usually under English law).15 Foreign juridical persons were inserted as    
                                                        
11 Ibid. 
12 Ostapets and Konovalov, note 8 above, at 51; Nikiforov and Bulgakov, note 9 above, at 28. 
13 In fact, the last two remedies could be ineffective as well. Damage claims encountered the practical difficulty 
of proving the amount of damages, whereas penalty clauses were usually enforced by courts in an amount 
lower than the original sum. For more details on penalty clauses, see notes 104-111 below and accompanying 
text. 
14 In the Megafon case the Federal Arbitrazh Court of West-Siberian Region refused to enforce the stockholder 
agreement by referring, inter alia, to Article 1202 (relations of a juridical person with its participants shall be 
regulated by the law applicable to the juridical person) and Article 1193 (foreign law rules chosen by parties 
shall not be applied if the consequences of their application would obviously contradict the public policy of    
the Russian Federation) of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation (Decision of the Federal Arbitrazh Court of 
West-Siberian Region, note 10 above). 
15 See Ostapets and Konovalov, note 8 above, at 54. Using foreign law to govern transactions with underlying 
Russian assets is not limited to shareholder agreements only. In an article on law and globalization The 
Economist indirectly pointed to the phenomenon of applying foreign law by two companies from the same 
country by stating that a global lawyer’s work, among other things, can include “writing a contract under English 
law between two companies in Russia” (“Not Entirely Free, Your Honour”, The Economist, 31 July 2010). Even State-
controlled companies and banks in Russia acknowledge that foreign law governs their important agreements 
and that disputes are considered by foreign courts. See Dmytri Kazmin and Philip Sterkin, «Юристы теряют 
рынок» [Lawyers Are Losing the Market], Ведомости [Gazette], 27 January 2011). The Financial Times 
speculated that more than half of cases in the commercial division of the London’s High Court are related to 
Russia or other former Soviet republics (Catherine Belton, Caroline Binham and Neil Buckley, “Oligarchs in 
London”, Financial Times, 8 October 2011.). One of the leading Russian corporate law practitioners (Andrei 
Goltsblat of Goltsblat BLP) recently in his blog described Russia as a state of law where “English law and 
Stockholm arbitration are triumphed”. 
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an additional layer between the beneficiary shareholders and Russian companies, holding  
the shares or stocks of the latter. 
To cope with the developments in corporate practice the legislator decided to act,16 and 
the Law on Joint-Stock Societies was amended in June 2009.17 According to the amendments 
(Article 32.1(1)), a stockholder agreement is an agreement concerning the exercise of rights 
certified by stocks, and/or concerning special rules of exercising rights over stocks.18 By      
this agreement parties are bound to exercise rights certified by the stocks and/or rights          
to the stocks in a specific manner, and/or refrain from the exercise of such rights. Then         
the paragraph continues by listing the scope of an agreement, indicating that stockholder 
agreements may provide for the obligation of the parties to: 
• vote in a certain way at the general meeting of stockholders; 
• agree on a variant of the voting with other stockholders; 
• acquire or dispose of stocks at a pre-determined price and/or with occurrence of a    
certain event; 
• refrain from the disposing of stocks until the occurrence of a certain event; 
• carry out in an agreed manner other activities related to the management of the   
company, its business, reorganization, and liquidation. 
The article sets two important limitations on stockholder agreements. First, stockholder 
agreements cannot bind its parties to vote according to the instructions of the management 
organs of a society whose stocks are affected by the agreement (Article 32.1(2)). And     
second, a stockholder agreement is binding only for its parties (Article 32.1(4)). The latter   
has two implications: agreements with third persons which result in the breaches of a 
stockholder agreement cannot be declared invalid on the mere ground of breaching the 
stockholder agreement;19 and a breach of a stockholder agreement cannot serve as grounds 
for invalidating the decisions and resolutions of the governing bodies of the company. 
Further, the amendments provide that stockholder agreements can define measures       
for securing the fulfillment of obligations and civil law remedies for non-performance or 
improper performance of the obligations.20  Such remedies  can be compensation of  damages, 
                                                        
16 In the United States, although stockholder agreements are practiced in close corporations, the development   
of case law started with hostile attitude towards such agreements by courts (Harwell Wells, “The Rise of the 
Close Corporation and the Making of Corporation Law”, Berkeley Business Law Journal, V (2008), pp. 297-304.). 
Apparently, in “following” countries the unenforceability of popular contractual mechanisms is more likely      
to result in legislative changes, because private party pressure, regulatory competition and the fact that such 
mechanisms have been at least tested in other jurisdictions make a strong case for action by legislatures. 
17 Federal Law “On Changing the Federal Law ‘On Joint-Stock Societies’ and Article 30 of the Federal Law      
‘On the Securities Market’”; СЗРФ(2009), no. 23, item 2770. For more details on the history of the legal reform 
see Oda, note 7 above, at 361-364. 
18 Rights over stocks relate to the transfer of stocks (purchase, sale, assignment of stocks, other property     
rights), whereas rights certified by stocks are those rights which are derived from the stocks and can be 
exercised by their holders (for instance, voting rights, dividend rights, information rights). 
19 The only exclusion when courts can invalidate agreements with third persons is when the third person was 
aware or should have been fully aware about the limitations set by the stockholder agreement. The interested 
parties of the stockholder agreement can bring such claims. The plaintiff also bears the burden of proof,      
which significantly complicates court action, because stockholder agreements are – as a matter of practice – 
generally confidential. Courts have to define a practice when third persons can be deemed to be aware about  
the provisions of a confidential stockholder agreement. 
20 Article 32.1(7), Law on Joint-Stock Societies. 
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penalty clauses, the payment of compensation for breaching a stockholder agreement (in a 
fixed amount or in an amount defined according to a stockholder agreement),21 as well as 
other remedies available in contract law (such as actions concerning the validity of contracts 
and contract termination).22 Another measure aimed at strengthening the effectiveness of 
contractual arrangements of stockholders is conditional stock buy-sell clauses. 
Shortly before the changes in the Law on Joint-Stock Societies, the legislature     
introduced into the Law on Limited Responsibility Societies similar rules on agreements 
between the members of limited responsibility societies. Article 8(3) of the Law on       
Limited Responsibility Societies contains only general information about the issues that    
may be included in the shareholder agreements of the members of limited responsibility 
societies. In contrast to the changes to the Law on Joint-Stock Societies, it does not specify 
further limits for the agreements, nor does it provide any guidelines for the enforcement       
of shareholder agreements. The wording of Article 8(1) is similar to the definition of 
stockholder agreements contained in Article 32.1(1) of the Law on Joint-Stock Societies.23   
This abstract wording in effect serves the aim of confirming the legality of shareholder 
agreements in principle, and leaves much room for future judicial interpretation. 
ENFORCEABILITY OF THE PROVISIONS OF SHAREHOLDER 
AGREEMENTS UNDER RUSSIAN AND ENGLISH LAW 
The issues raised in Russian judicial practice on shareholder agreements24 and in        
doctrinal writings on the use of shareholder agreements in Russia25 allow the following 
                                                        
21 Article 32.1(7) of the Law on Joint-Stock Societies does not use the term “liquidated damages” by reason         
of the principle of full compensation of damages under Russian civil law. However, the suggested remedy of 
compensation probably will serve as the functional equivalent of liquidated damages in Russian law, allowing 
the parties of stockholder agreements to make a choice between the specific performance of their obligations  
and the payment of compensation/damages. 
22 By reason of differences in English and Russian contract law, the list of remedies in several cases does           
not overlap. English law offers such remedies as injunctions, specific performance, damages, rescission (and 
damages) for misrepresentation or a breach of a fundamental term of the shareholder agreement, termination. 
23 See note 18 above and accompanying text. For a brief description of Article 8(1) and its legislative history     
see Oda, note 7 above, at 362-363. 
24 Decision of the Federal Arbitrazh Court of West-Siberian Region, note 10 above (declaring illegal the 
provisions of the stockholder agreement deviating from the imperative rules of the Law on Joint-Stock Societies 
and company charters); Decision of the Arbitrazh Court of Moscow, 26 December 2006, No. A40-62048/06-81- 
343 (the stockholder agreement was considered invalid because its provisions were contrary to imperative   
rules of the Civil Code, the Law on Joint-Stock Societies and the provisions of the charter of the company;        
the court also stated that the provision of the agreement establishing its priority over the charter was illegal); 
Decision of the Arbitrazh Court of Moscow, 13 March 2008, No. A40-68771/07-81-413 (an imperative statutory 
rule cannot be altered by the agreement of stockholders; although the defendant also raised the question of 
relations between the stockholder agreement and the charter, the court refrained from expressing its position   
on the issue). 
25 See Ostapets and Konovalov, note 8 above, at 51, 54 (for the contradictions between imperative rules and      
the provisions of stockholder agreements, the availability of specific performance of the agreements and default 
event clauses, and the effect of the breaches of stockholder agreements on corporate acts); Evgenii Levinskii, 
«Использование модели соглашения акционеров в России” [Use of a Stockholder Agreement Model in 
Russia], Закон [Law], no. 10 (2006), pp. 128-129 and Alexander Ivanov and Nadezhda Lebedeva, «Соглашения 
акционеров: шаг вперед или топтание на месте» [Stockholder Agreements: A Step Forward or Running        
in Place], Корпоративный юрист [Corporate Jurist], no. 9 (2008), pp. 51-53 (explaining the impossibility of 
specific performance of stockholder agreements according to Russian law and showing the limits of penalty 
clauses); Oda, note 7 above, at 364, 366-368 (with regard to the disposal and acquisition of shares as a means to 
secure the  performance of obligations  arising out of a shareholder agreement, the  participation of the company 
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“controversial” issues to be singled out with regard to the enforcement of shareholder 
agreements: 
- non-compliance of shareholder agreements with imperative norms and/or the internal 
documents of companies (company charters); 
- the effect of breaches of shareholders agreements on company decisions (resolutions)   
and on transactions with third persons; 
- the right of a company to be a party in a shareholder agreement between its   
shareholders; 
- claiming specific performance of a shareholder agreement in court/using court  
injunctions for the specific performance of shareholder agreements. 
In the remainder of this section these questions are the basis for the comparative analysis 
of English and Russian law on shareholder agreements. 
Contradictions between Imperative Norms and Company Charters and Shareholder 
Agreements 
Russian judicial practice concerning shareholder agreements is clear on the priority of 
imperative legal rules and of charter provisions over shareholder agreements. Those 
provisions of shareholder agreements which do not comply with imperative legal 
requirements and are in conflict with charter provisions are invalid, and thus do not create 
any legal consequences. In the Megafon case the court listed all the imperative provisions       
of the Law on Joint-Stock Societies and the charter provisions of Megafon Open Joint-Stock 
Society that were in conflict with the stockholder agreement– among them the quorum    
rules for general and extraordinary stockholder meetings and board of directors, rules on 
notification of stockholders, cumulative voting rules for the formation of the board, rules     
on the election of the board chairman, rules on the exclusive competence of the meeting of 
stockholders and board.26 The Arbitrazh Court of Moscow adopted a similar approach in    
the Russian Standard Insurance case.27 
This approach was confirmed by the courts in a similar dispute involving a shareholder 
agreement between the participants of a limited responsibility society.28 The Arbitrazh    
                                                                                                                                               
itself in the shareholder agreement, the enforceability of a shareholder agreement against the company, the 
effect of the breach of a shareholder agreement on transactions with third persons and on the decisions of 
corporate bodies, the availability of specific performance of shareholder agreements); Dmytri Stepanov, 
«Договор об осуществлении прав участников ООО» [Contract of Participants of a Limited Responsibility 
Society], Вестник Высшего Арбитражного Суда Российской Федерации [Herald of Supreme Arbitrazh  
Court of Russian Federation], no. 12 (2010), pp. 66-74, 78-79, 87, 90 (discussing the contradictions between 
shareholder agreements, on one hand, and statutory rules and the charter on the other, participation of the 
society in its shareholders’ agreement, specific performance of shareholder agreements, possible results of 
breaching a shareholder agreement on corporate acts and transactions with third persons). 
26 Decision of the Federal Arbitrazh Court of West-Siberian Region, note 10 above. 
27 Decision of the Arbitrazh Court of Moscow, note 24 above (in contravention of the statute and the charter       
of the insurance company, the stockholder agreement, for instance, provided for different number of the board 
members, differing procedures for the appointment of the company chief executive officer and the election of 
the board members). 
28 Legal practitioners simulated the dispute between the members of Vernyi Znak Limited Responsibility         
Society in order to clarify the position of courts on the changes on shareholder agreements. The shareholders of 
the  limited  responsibility  society  entered  into a shareholder   agreement and   included in it provisions  which   
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Court of Moscow confirmed the priority of imperative legal rules and charter provisions  
over the provisions of shareholder agreements by stating that an agreement serves the        
aim of providing more details with regard to the allocation of the rights of the members of 
limited responsibility societies (rather than replace those of the charter of the company).29 
The priority of imperative rules over the provisions of shareholder agreements in   
Russian law is also supported in legal scholarship published after the introduction of the 
rules on stockholder agreements in the Law on Joint-Stock Societies.30 
The relation between the articles of association and a shareholder agreement is a 
controversial issue in English law too. The usual recommendation of legal advisers is to 
adjust the provisions of the articles of association with the provisions of a shareholder 
agreement.31 Sometimes shareholder agreements provide the obligation for the parties to 
amend the articles of association in line with the provisions of the agreement. In such cases 
shareholder agreements in effect describe in more detail the mechanisms of the realization    
of the rights and liabilities provided in the company’s articles. These detailed provisions     
are less vulnerable from the perspective of their enforcement in courts. Moreover, in   
addition to contractual remedies they entitle the use of corporate law remedies – such as     
the invalidation of corporate resolutions. Some agreements also establish their precedence  
for the shareholders over the articles of association. 
An example of a case where the court gave priority to the contractual obligations          
over the articles of association is British Murac Syndicate Ltd. v Alperton Rubber Company    
Ltd.32 According to the agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant, as long as           
the plaintiff held a certain number of shares in the defendant, it would have the right             
to appoint two directors. A similar provision was included in the articles of association          
of the defendant company. After the defendant refused to accept the nomination of the 
plaintiff and intended to alter the articles to remove the right of nomination, the court 
granted an injunction to restrain the alteration of the articles of association for the purpose   
of committing the breach of the contractual obligations.33 
                                                                                                                                               
were in contradiction with the federal law and the charter of the society. In particular, the parties tested the 
possibility of the participation of the society in the agreement, restricting the right to sell shares, depriving a 
party of voting rights as a result of breaching the agreement (Yulia Govorun and Philip Sterkin, «Эксперимент 
для прецедента» [An Experiment for a Precedent], Ведомости [Gazette], 3 March 2010; Dmytri Dmitriev, 
«Актуальный пример оспаривания договора об осуществлении прав участников ООО» [Actual Example  
of Contesting the Shareholder Contract of a Limited Responsibility Society], Слияния и поглощения [Mergers 
and Acquisitions], no. 1-2 (2010), p. 66). 
29 Decision of the Arbitrazh Court of Moscow, 24 November 2010, No. A40-140918/09-132-894. The position       
of the trial court was confirmed by the appellate court (Decree of the Ninth Arbitrazh Appellate Court of 17 
February 2011, No. A40-140918/09-132-894.). The cassation court, however, pointed only to the inconsistencies  
of the agreement with the imperative statutory rules (Decree of the Federal Arbitrazh Court of Moscow Region, 
30 May 2011, No. A40-140918/09-132-894.). The Supreme Arbitrazh Court declined to consider the case. 
30 See Igor Korneev and Victoria Arutiunian, «Акционерное соглашение: заключение, содержание и 
исполнение» [Shareholder Agreement: Conclusion, Content, and Performance], Корпоративный юрист 
[Corporate Jurist], no. 1 (2010), p. 33. 
31 See Christopher Rose, “Don’t be the Second Little Pig”, International Financial Law Review, no. 10 (2007), p.     
33. The main benefit of integrating the provisions of a shareholder agreement into the articles of association is 
that while a breach of a shareholder agreement gives rise to contractual remedies, a breach of the company’s 
articles can be a ground for the invalidation of the action itself. At the same time, this strategy encounters 
informational disadvantages, because shareholder agreements usually are confidential, whereas the company’s 
articles are available to the public. 
32 [1915] 2 Ch. 186. 
33 [1915] 2 Ch. 186, 193-5. 
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Later cases in effect changed this approach – in Southern Foundries (1926) Ltd. v Shirlaw   
the court held that alterations of the articles of association did not constitute a breach             
of the contractual obligations of the company, but the exercise of the power under the   
altered articles, in contravention of the terms of the contractual obligations, did constitute      
a breach. Therefore, no injunction could be granted to prevent the alteration of the articles    
of association.34 This approach implied that by its contractual obligations a company did     
not undertake to refrain from altering its articles, but rather to pay damages in a case      
where the articles were altered. The articles of association were entrenched indirectly by 
placing a financial premium on their alteration.35 
However, in Russell v Northern Bank Development Corporation Ltd. the House of Lords 
established a different rule. Any contractual obligation undertaken by a company not to   
alter its articles is invalid.36 As the House of Lords did not make any reference to the dicta     
in Southern Foundries (1926) Ltd. v Shirlaw, it can be presumed that the case is overruled.37   
Yet, the House of Lords distinguished between the agreements between the company         
and the shareholders, on one hand, and the agreement between the shareholders on the  
other. In opposition to a direct undertaking by a company not to alter its articles, the court 
established the validity of the personal contractual obligations of shareholders, which         
can in effect prevent alterations of the articles of association – such as the agreement of 
shareholders to vote unanimously for such alterations.38 Hence, contradictions between       
the provisions of shareholder agreements and articles of associations do not invalidate the 
former, and at least lead to the obligation of the defaulting party to compensate damages. 
Case law on the relationship between shareholder agreements and imperative      
statutory provisions is clearer. The rules on the duties of company directors who own    
shares of the company demonstrate this relation. The contractual arrangements of such 
shareholders (directors) cannot fetter their statutory general duties in the capacity of the 
company directors (for example, the duty to promote the success of the company, duty          
to exercise independent judgment).39 In Kregor v Hollins the court established a rule that 
directors must not fetter their discretion (independent judgment).40 For example, a director 
cannot agree in a shareholder agreement to vote in a particular way in the interests of a 
creditor or other shareholder. 
The priority of imperative statutory rules over the provisions of shareholder     
agreements also follows from the long established principle in case law, which prescribes  
that a company forgo its statutory right to alter its articles of association. Any provision     
                                                        
34 [1940] A.C. 701, 740-1. This approach was followed in Cumbrian Newspapers Group Ltd. v Cumberland & 
Westmorland Herald Newspaper & Printing Co. Ltd. ([1987] 1 Ch. 1, 24.). 
35 Clare M. S. McGlynn, “The Constitution of the Company: Mandatory Statutory Provisions v Private 
Agreements”, Company Lawyer, XV (1994), p. 302. 
36 [1992] 1 W.L.R. 588, 593. 
37 McGlynn, note 35 above, at 303. 
38 [1992] 1 W.L.R. 588, 594-5. 
39 Companies Act 2006, sections 170-177. 
40 Kregor v Hollins [1913] 109 L.T. 225, 228 (if a director has to promote the interests of a shareholder who 
nominated him, rather than the interests of the whole body of shareholders which are in conflict, then the 
agreement is unlawful). The standard was softened in Fulham Football Club Ltd. v Cabra Estates plc – directors can 
bind themselves to act in a particular manner in the future, if they properly, in the exercise of their discretion, 
enter into contractual arrangements that as a whole are for the substantial benefit of the company ([1992] B.C.C. 
863, 876.). 
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that limits the power of a company to alter its articles is invalid on the ground that it is 
contrary to the statute.41 
Voting agreements can be viewed as exceptions that actually can alter the statutory 
provisions on the required minimum voting thresholds. The common law acknowledges    
the freedom of shareholders to enter into contracts that prescribe the way they will exercise 
their votes.42 At the same time, the law bans provisions in the articles of association that 
restrict the company’s statutory power to alter the articles or its share capital by a special 
resolution. For instance, the articles cannot provide for a unanimous vote by shareholders    
in such cases, as special resolutions require only a 75% majority vote.43 As is shown below    
in more detail, the court banned a company from participating in alternative undertakings 
(outside the articles of association) with a similar effect as well. However, the court refused  
to invalidate the agreement as regard to the shareholders of the company.44 
Due to the subtle distinction established in Russell, a similar effect can be achieved           
by the means of a shareholder agreement that does not include the company as a party.      
For instance, an agreement between shareholders to vote unanimously for a resolution to 
change the articles of association is a substitute mechanism that prevents the company     
from changing its articles of association by the statutory 75% majority-voting requirement.   
In other words, the provisions of the statute on altering the company’s articles with special 
resolutions were considered as imperative with respect to the company’s obligations. But   
the same provisions were treated as enabling with regard to the personal undertakings of 
shareholders.45 
However, the claim that voting agreements can alter imperative statutory rules is 
probably too ambitious. Before Russell, courts acknowledged the possibility of altering   
voting threshold requirements also by the articles of association of small “partnership-     
like” companies. In Bushell v Faith the House of Lords considered valid a provision of          
the articles of association that in effect prevented the removal of a director without his 
consent, although statutory rules provided for the right of a company to remove a director  
by a simple majority vote, “notwithstanding anything in its articles” (Companies Act 1948, 
section 184).46 The decision of the court was based on the reasoning that the Companies      
Act specified the type of the resolution required (ordinary resolution), whereas companies 
and shareholders are free in allocating voting rights for such resolutions.47 Therefore, in      
the light of Bushell v Faith the definition of required voting thresholds for specific matters     
                                                        
41 Walker v London Tramways [1879] 12 Ch.D. 705; Allen v Gold Reefs of West Africa Ltd. [1900] 1 Ch. 656, 671; 
Southern Foundries (1926) Ltd. v Shirlaw [1940] A.C. 701, 739. 
42 Eilis Ferran, “The Decision of the House of Lords in Russell v. Northern Bank Development Corporation 
Limited”, Cambridge Law Journal, LIII (1994), p. 345 (with references to case law). Judge Judson of the Supreme 
Court of Canada acknowledged that voting arrangements are “not prohibited either by law, by good morals or public 
order” (Ringuet et al. v Bergeron [1960] S.C.R. 672, 684.). 
43 Companies Act 2006, section 283. 
44 See below the discussion of Russell v Northern Bank Development Corporation Ltd. 
45 Peter Jaffey, “Contractual Obligations of the Company in General Meeting”, Legal Studies, XVI (1996),              
p. 35. McGlynn analyzed the judgment of the House of Lords within the framework of contractual freedom       
in corporate law and state interference. The court attempted to balance both approaches – “on the one hand 
upholding the statutory power, on the other validating the shareholders’ agreement”. See McGlynn, note 35 above, at 
303-304, 306. 
46 Bushell v Faith [1970] A.C. 1099. 
47 [1970] A.C. 1099, 1110-1. The same reasoning was used by the Court of Appeal (Bushell v Faith [1969] 2 Ch.  
438, 448.). The position of the courts in Bushell v Faith is highly criticized in scholarly literature. See Ferran, note 
42 above, at 346-347 (with references to the scholarly literature). 
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by shareholder agreements is interfering with the provisions of the articles of association, 
rather than with statutory provisions.48 
To ensure a consistent approach regarding the relations between the provisions of 
shareholder agreements and the articles of association a disclosure requirement has been 
introduced by the Companies Act 2006.49 When the provisions of a shareholder agreement,   
in effect, materially change the company’s governance and affect statutory rules and the 
provisions of the articles of association (on voting, appointment of directors, transfer of 
shares, etc.), the agreement requires disclosure.50 Sections 17 and 29 of the Companies Act 
2006 regard such agreements as a company’s constitution (on a par with the company’s 
articles) and require their submission to the registrar (Companies House). In particular,       
the following agreements between shareholders require disclosure: 
a) agreements between all shareholders of a company which have an effect that, if not         
so agreed to, would require a passage of a special resolution (for instance, agreements  
that effectively alter the articles of association); 
b) agreements between all shareholders of a class of shares of a company which have an 
effect that, if not so agreed to, would require voting by a particular majority; 
c) any agreement that effectively binds all shareholders of a class of shares though not 
agreed to by all those shareholders.51 
A provision of a shareholder agreement providing for its precedence over the articles of 
association can be considered as changing the nature of the agreement, and hence will   
trigger the requirement of its disclosure. 
In conclusion, both Russian and English laws are clear on the priority of imperative 
statutory rules over the provisions of shareholder agreements. With regard to the  
relationship between the company charters and shareholder agreements, Russian law         
has the same approach: in case of conflicts, the provisions of shareholder agreements are 
invalid. In contrary to this, in English law the conflicts between the company articles and 
shareholder  agreements  do  not  invalidate  the  latter. But such  conflicts – more particularly     
                                                        
48 At the same time, it should be admitted that Bushell v Faith and Russell contain contradictory implications,    
for the first tolerates distinctions from statutory powers in the company’s articles of small businesses, whereas 
the second allows such distinctions only as a personal agreement of shareholders which does not involve the 
company itself. In Russell the court assumed the imperative nature of the statutory provisions and refrained 
from discussing the possible extent of their enabling nature. For the discussion of the nature of the provisions   
of the Companies Act on the alterations of the articles of association (imperative or enabling) see Peter Jaffey, 
“Restraining the Exercise of Corporate Statutory Powers”, Denning Law Journal, IX (1994), pp. 68-77. 
49 It is worth mentioning that a liberal view in English scholarship arguing for maximum contractual freedom   
in shareholder agreements (including with regard to the participation of the company in its shareholder 
agreement) criticized the decision in Russell as well. However, in accord with liberal views the solution was  
seen in lifting the restrictions set on companies to bind themselves by their shareholder agreements. See Ferran, 
note 42 above, 362. 
50 Mads Andenæs and Junko Ueda, “Shareholders’ Agreements: Some EU and English Law Perspectives”, 
Tsukuba Law Journal, no. 3 (2007), p. 137. 
51 Companies Act 2006, section 29(1). The interpretation of Section 29 by the courts can be broader and might 
require the disclosure of shareholder agreements in other cases as well. See Anna Ovcharova and Ekaterina 
Sjostrand, «Правовое регулирование и практические аспекты заключения и исполнения соглашений 
акционеров по российскому и английскому праву: сравнительный анализ» [Legal Regulation and   
Practical Aspects of the Conclusion and Performance of Stockholder Agreements under Russian and English 
law: Comparative Analysis], Слияния и поглощения [Mergers and Acquisitions], no. 12 (2009), p. 73. 
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in cases where they have external effects for non-participating shareholders and/or third 
persons – in effect change the status of shareholder agreements by rendering them into a 
company constitution and leading to their registration and disclosure. 
External Effects of a Breach of Shareholder Agreements 
As mentioned above, the changes in Russian law directly rule out any effect of breaches        
of stockholder agreements on the decisions and resolutions of the corporate organs of          
the involved company, including with respect to transactions with third persons.52 The 
restrictions follow from the clear demarcation between the contractual relations of the   
parties to a stockholder agreement and the relations of a stockholder with a company.      
They can be explained by the aim of limiting the external effects of stockholder agreements 
given their confidential nature. The provisions of stockholder agreements in general do       
not create effects for non-participating stockholders, for the company itself, its contracting 
parties, and personal creditors of stockholders. To create such external effects, similar 
provisions would need to be included in the charter. 
In English law the analysis of shareholder agreements within the contractual context 
shows that unlike the articles of association,53 shareholder agreements create personal 
obligations between their immediate parties only. They do not become a “constitution” of   
the company (by analogy with the articles of association), and they are not binding on the 
transferees of the parties to it or upon new or non-assenting shareholders.54 Similarly, the 
contractual nature of shareholder agreements implies that such agreements do not affect 
transactions with third persons and company resolutions. 
Some exceptions are possible when shareholder agreements exceed the bounds of          
the contractual context, the main one being the unanimous shareholder agreements in  
private limited companies.55 Case law equated unanimous informal agreements of all 
shareholders with a resolution of a general meeting.56 The requirement of the disclosure of 
unanimous shareholder agreements of the Companies Act 2006 transforms them into part    
of a company’s constitution.57 In these cases it is no surprise that shareholder agreements 
create external effects for companies’ acts and third person transactions. For instance, an 
action breaching a company’s constitution, such as a transfer of shares to a third person in 
breach of restrictions, is invalid. 
To sum up, both Russian and English law set strict limits on the external effects of 
shareholder    agreements,    conditioning   such  effects  on  the   availability  of   information.            
                                                        
52 See above note 19 and accompanying text. 
53 English law treats the articles of association as a contract between the company and a member in respect of  
her rights and liabilities as a shareholder. However, it is a matter of debate whether this “contract” extends to 
the relations between shareholders. While the older authorities support the view that the rights and liabilities of 
shareholders as shareholders may be enforced by or against the shareholders only through the company, more 
recent authorities support the direct enforcement of the articles of associations by shareholders against other 
shareholders. See Andenæs and Ueda, note 50 above, at 138-139. 
54 Andenæs and Ueda, note 50 above, at 138-140; Len Sealy and Sarah Worthington, Cases and Materials in 
Company Law (2008), p. 230. 
55 The use of unanimous shareholders agreements is practically impossible in listed companies with the large 
number of stockholders. 
56 Mathias M. Siems, Convergence in Shareholder Law (2008), pp. 54-55. 
57 For the limited cases when shareholder agreements should be disclosed and acquire the status of a   
company’s constitution see above notes 49-51 and accompanying text. 
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But Russian law permits external effects of shareholder agreements for third person 
transactions only, whereas English law takes a step further allowing external effects for 
company resolutions as well. At the same time, possible effects of shareholder agreements   
on company resolutions in Russian law should not be ruled out, because the courts still    
have to express their opinion on this matter, more particularly in the context of unanimous 
agreements between all shareholders (stockholders). 
Parties to Shareholder Agreements 
In the draft version, the changes to the Law on Joint-Stock Societies with regard to 
stockholder agreements were clear that the company itself cannot participate in a  
stockholder agreement concerning its stocks.58 This is important because the participation     
of the company in a stockholder agreement strengthens the enforceability of such  
agreements against the company. Hence, a breach of the agreement can affect corporate     
acts and also indirectly third persons. 
Although, in the current version, Article 32.1 of the Law on Joint-Stock Societies does    
not explicitly ban such participation, legal scholars are not unanimous in their opinions. 
According to one approach, the interpretation of the article does not allow the society in 
relation to whose shares a stockholder agreement is to be concluded to become a party to   
it.59 
The opposite opinion offers a broader list of the participants of shareholder agreements. 
In the absence of an explicit legal ban, there are no grounds for refusing other parties,       
such as a portfolio manager, a nominal holder of shares (stocks), the society itself and     
future shareholders (stockholders), to participate in shareholder agreements.60 However,        
it should be noted that the proponents of this approach concede that the rights and 
obligations of the society under the stockholder agreement should be limited: for instance,  
the society can be bound by the terms on the assignment of the stocks owned by it, but it 
cannot participate in voting agreements61 and cannot affect such agreements.62 Moreover,   
the society should not be obliged to perform a decision made by the stockholders      
according to the agreement, if such a decision is made in contradiction to the provisions        
of the   society  charter.63  Apparently,  this  view  allows  for  the  participation  of the  society           
                                                        
58 Oda, note 7 above, at 362. 
59 Dmytri Lomakin, «Договор об осуществлении прав участников хозяйственных обществ как новелла 
корпоративного законодательства» [Agreements on the Effectuation of the Rights of Participants of Economic 
Societies as a Innovation of Corporate Legislation], Вестник Высшего Арбитражного Суда Российской 
Федерации [Herald of Supreme Arbitrazh Court of Russian Federation], no. 8 (2009), p. 15; Oda, note 7 above, 
at 366. 
60 Alexander Kudelin, «Акционерное соглашение по российскому праву» (Часть I) [Stockholder   
Agreements under Russian law, Part I], Корпоративный юрист [Corporate Jurist], no. 10 (2009), p. 24. See also 
Korneev and Arutiunian, note 30 above, at 33-34 (with regard to the participation of the holders of the rights on 
pledged stocks, portfolio managers, holders of depository receipts, other third persons (future stockholders) and 
the company in stockholder agreements; although admitting that court practice might deny the enforcement of 
stockholder agreements with regard to the rights of third persons and non-direct (beneficiary) stockholders). 
61 According to Article 72(3) of the Law on Joint-Stock Societies and Article 24(1) of the Law on Limited 
Responsibility Societies, in cases of owning their own stocks (shares), companies cannot vote them. 
62 As mentioned above, Article 32.1(2) denies legal effect to the obligations of the stockholders to vote in 
accordance with the instructions of the company organs. 
63 Kudelin, note 60 above, at 25-26. Similarly, most obligations of future shareholders should be conditional    
and should be performed only after a party formally becomes a shareholder (id., at 26.). 
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in its stockholders’ agreement as an owner of its own stocks, rather than as an issuer of        
the stocks. This restriction logically (from the perspective of Article 32.1 of the Law on     
Joint-Stock Societies) and rationally limits the effect of the enforcement of a stockholder 
agreement on society decisions and resolutions and on relations with third persons. 
In English law the question of the possibility of the participation of a company in a 
shareholder agreement does not raise doubts. However, the common law has developed 
restrictive standards for such participation. One landmark case is Russell v Northern Bank 
Development Corporation Ltd. The shareholder agreement between the all shareholders            
of Tyrone Brick Ltd. and the company itself provided that further share capital could be  
issued only by the written consent of each party to the agreement. Further, the agreement 
established that its terms should have precedence between the shareholders over the    
articles of association of Tyrone Brick Ltd.64 The House of Lords decided that a company 
cannot be party to a shareholder agreement which restricts its statutory powers; however,   
an agreement between the shareholders with the same effect is not invalid and can be 
enforced by courts.65 In other words, if the company participates in its shareholders’ 
agreement and the agreement sets limits on the statutory powers of the company, it is 
considered no more than a personal voting agreement between the shareholders. In its 
argumentation the court, inter alia, relied on the possible effects of such agreements on   
future shareholders. In Russell the agreement between the shareholders was permitted 
because it was “purely personal to the shareholders who executed it and … does not purport             
to bind future shareholders”.66 Another important argument for permitting the personal 
agreement between shareholders from the perspective of economic analysis, which was not 
mentioned in the reasoning by the court, is that the shareholder agreement of Tyrone         
Brick Ltd. included all shareholders. 
Under the Companies Act 2006, a similar provision in a shareholder agreement67 will 
transform the agreement into part of the company’s constitution and will trigger the 
requirement of the disclosure thereof.68 This consequence follows even if a company does   
not participate in the agreement. Therefore, possible conflicts of interests between the 
involved parties (current and future shareholders, in particular) are mitigated. 
The analysis of the law in both jurisdictions shows that sound reasons exist for       
limiting the scope of the participation of the company in its shareholders’ agreement.          
The restrictions have materialized into English law. Due to the absence of court practice, 
Russian law is unclear not only on the scope of the restrictions, but also on the possibility      
of company participation in a shareholder agreement in general. However, as the law       
does not directly restrict such participation, court practice will probably allow it subject to 
several restrictions. 
 
                                                        
64 Russell v Northern Bank Development Corporation Ltd. [1992] 1 W.L.R. 588, 590. 
65 [1992] 1 W.L.R. 588, 593. 
66 [1992] 1 W.L.R. 588, 594. 
67 The shareholder agreement of Tyrone Brick Ltd. provided that “[n]o further share capital shall be created or     
issued in the company … without the written consent of each of the parties hereto” ([1992] 1 W.L.R. 588, 590.). 
68 Companies Act 2006, section 29.See also above notes 49-51 and accompanying text. 
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Availability of the Specific Performance of Shareholder Agreements 
According to legal doctrine, Russian law does not allow for the specific performance of 
shareholder agreements. Legal theory explains this limitation by the non-proprietary     
nature of the most of the rights and obligations included in shareholder agreements.69            
In addition, courts cannot anticipate possible breaches of shareholder agreements and  
require performance in line with contractual obligations in advance, for instance, by      
forcing shareholders to vote in a specific way. Only infringed rights are subject to legal 
defense.70 This categorical view can be explained by the narrow limitation of the notion of 
specific performance and the equating thereof with court injunctions. 
Doctrinal writings contain the opposite view, according to which specific performance    
of stockholder agreements (more specifically, injunctions) in Russia is theoretically possible 
(based on an interpretation of Article 32.1 of the Law on Joint-Stock Societies; however, not 
confirmed by the judicial practice yet) in limited cases. In particular, when the general 
meeting of stockholders approves a large-scale transaction in violation of the stockholder 
agreement (stockholders agreed to vote against, but one of them voted for the approval of  
the deal), a court can issue an injunction addressed to the defaulting stockholder to vote        
in a specific way in the next general meeting of stockholders, which can be convened to 
reverse the resolution. However, this is possible as long as the large-scale transaction is not 
yet performed at the time of the second meeting.71 
The unavailability of specific performance for all provisions of shareholder agreements    
is also questioned by Korneev and Arutyunyan. For instance, there are no reasonable 
explanations for denying specific performance in the case of conditional terms on selling 
shares. According to Article 396(2) of the Russian Civil Code, compensation for losses and 
payment of a penalty for non-performance of an obligation shall free a party from specific 
performance of the obligation, unless otherwise provided by legislation or contract.         
Thus, parties to a shareholder agreement should be entitled to provide in the agreement    
that the application of liability measures does not free the defaulting party from the      
specific performance of its obligations (for instance, the transfer of shares under certain 
conditions).72 
In the United Kingdom specific performance is available only when the nature of  
relations makes the remedy appropriate. Voting agreements are an example of such 
contractual relations. English law of equity allows for the granting of negative/prohibitive 
injunctions binding shareholders to refrain from voting in a general meeting for particular 
resolutions.73 Courts can also grant binding injunctions to compel shareholders to vote in       
a particular manner based on their contractual obligations.74 
In Russell the House of Lords in effect accepted the availability of negative injunctions 
when a voting agreement practically interfered in the provisions of the statute and the  
articles of association. The court deemed the clause of the agreement as a valid personal 
                                                        
69 Levinskii, note 25 above, at 128-129. 
70 Ivanov and Lebedeva, note 25 above, at 51-52. 
71 Alexander Kudelin, «Акционерное соглашение по российскому праву» (Часть II) [Stockholder 
Agreements under Russian Law, Part II], Корпоративный юрист [Corporate Jurist], no. 11, p. 8. 
72 Korneev and Arutiunian, note 30 above, at 36. 
73 Greenwell v Porter [1902] 1 Ch. 530, 536. 
74 Puddephatt v Leith [1916] 1 Ch. 200, 202. 
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agreement between the shareholders.75 After the Companies Act 2006, such court    
injunctions are less controversial, as the shareholder agreement would have the status of     
the company constitution. 
Obviously, in the case of voting agreements specific performance is not available ex post, 
after the voting on the general meeting of shareholders has taken place. This interpretation   
is backed by the dictum of Lord Davey in Thomas Abercromby Welton v Joseph John Saffery,76 
and the argumentation of Lord Macmillan expressed in Inland Revenue Commissioners v J. 
Bibby & Sons Ltd.77 In Puddephatt v Leith the court was able to require the defendant to vote 
according to the instructions of the plaintiff based on the shareholder agreement, because     
in the preceding general meeting the defendant had voted against the instructions of the 
plaintiff and was insisting on his right to vote independently in the following meeting.78 
Specific performance in English law encounters other difficulties, which make specific 
performance in particular circumstances unavailable or impractical. Some of these   
difficulties are the outcome of the equitable nature of specific performance; the others are 
related with possible damage claims of the defendant in the event if the plaintiff does not 
succeed at trial.79 
To strengthen the specific performance of shareholder agreements, parties to such 
agreements make a special clause which provides that, in cases of a breach of the agreements, 
the parties assumed specific performance as a remedy. However, United Kingdom courts   
are not bound by such clauses. Rather the courts grant damages as an appropriate remedy.  
In the absence of penalty clauses in English law, liquidated damages and an obligation to   
sell shares as a responsibility measure (at a pre-defined price or price defined according to     
a mechanisms established in advance in the agreement) play a significant role. 
In summary, Russian court practice on the scope of the specific performance of 
shareholder agreements is absent, but the limited availability of specific performance is 
acknowledged by legal scholarship. In the United Kingdom, the law of equity, although   
clear on the availability of specific performance in the context of shareholder agreements, 
puts significant restrictions on it. 
SHAREHOLDER AGREEMENTS OF RUSSIAN COMPANIES GOVERNED 
BY ENGLISH LAW: WHAT COUNTS? 
Analysis shows that in their capacity as a contractual instrument in both jurisdictions, 
shareholder agreements encounter similar treatment and enforcement issues.80 This  
                                                        
75 Ferran, note 42 above, at 344-345. 
76 [1897] A.C. 299, 331 (“… individual shareholders may deal with their own interests by contract in such way as they 
may think fit. But such contracts, whether made by all or some only of the shareholders, would create personal obligations, 
or an exception personalis against themselves only, and would not become a regulation of the company, or be binding on  
the transferees of the parties to it, or upon new or non-assenting shareholders.”). 
77 [1945] 1 All E.R. 667, 670-1 (“… a shareholder may be bound under contract to vote in a particular way. But with    
such restrictions a company has nothing to do. It must accept and act upon the shareholder’s vote, notwithstanding that it 
may be given contrary to some duty which he owes to outsiders. The remedy for such breach lies elsewhere.”). 
78 [1916] 1 Ch. 200, 202. Similarly, in Greenwell v Porter shareholders threatened to vote against their contractual 
obligation before the general meeting ([1902] 1 Ch. 530, 531-2.). 
79 For the brief discussion of specific performance of shareholder agreements in common law jurisdictions see 
Michael J. Duffy, “Shareholders’ Agreements and Shareholders’ Remedies: Contract Versus Statute?”, Bond Law 
Review, XX (2008), pp. 13-14. 
80 The  treatment  of  shareholder  agreements  in  the  United  States   with  regard  to  the “controversial  issues”             
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similarity raises a question about the alleged continuing popularity, among Russian      
private actors, of English law to govern shareholder agreements. In this part of the study     
we use the results of the comparative analysis, social factors and economic reasoning to 
explain the popularity of English law as the law applicable to shareholder agreements           
of Russian companies. At the same time, we do not pretend to provide a complete list of 
possible explanations. Nor is it possible here to determine the importance of particular 
explanations. 
Structure (Imperative versus Enabling) of Corporate Law 
Although containing contractual obligations of the shareholders, shareholder agreements  
also affect the internal governance of companies. Given the important role of statutory 
provisions in internal governance, the scope of shareholder agreements has limits in both 
countries. Therefore, these limits are the result of corporate law restrictions of particular 
jurisdictions, rather than the outcome of contract law. The greater the role of imperative 
provisions in corporate statutes, the less will be the scope of freedom in the contractual 
relations of the parties. The simple reason for this is that a contract cannot override    
statutory rules. 
This shows that a crucial factor in defining the effectiveness of shareholder agreements    
is the nature of corporate law in general. The prevalence of enabling rules over imperative 
rules in corporate law statutes affects positively the scope of the agreements. Therefore,       
the popularity of English law in governing the shareholder agreements of companies        
with a majority of Russian participants can be attributed to the nature of the imperative 
structure of Russian corporate law in general and the absence of differentiated approaches   
of regulation for listed and non-listed business entities. Whereas in the United Kingdom 
shareholder agreements are mainly encountered in non-listed companies, implying both 
statutory flexibility and readiness of the courts to enforce private contractual arrangements 
due to the less acute nature of the conflicts of interests of the involved parties, Russian 
corporate law applies a “one-size-fits-all” approach to all societies. 
The need to differentiate between listed and non-listed companies is better demonstrated 
by United States court practice, where the rise of shareholder agreements started when        
the courts introduced differing approaches for corporations and close corporations.81             
In the early twentieth century inflexible governance structures designed for large listed 
companies in the form of imperative rules did not provide much scope for contractual 
arrangements of the participants of smaller non-listed firms. Courts, for their part, refused    
to consider differences between listed and close corporations arising from differing needs     
                                                                                                                                               
is slightly different from the ways English and Russian law deal with shareholder agreements. The United  
States courts are more inclined to grant specific performance and injunctions for the enforcement of shareholder 
agreements (Duffy, note 79 above, at 13). Similarly to English and Russian law, according to common law in   
the United States, shareholder agreements cannot violate statutory provisions. However, it is argued that the 
statutory law itself has changed this approach, and currently an agreement among shareholders is effective  
even if inconsistent with one or more provisions of corporate statutes (id., 6-8). Below it is shown that in reality 
the implications of this rule are far more similar to the approaches pursued in English and Russian law with 
regard to the relations between contractual arrangements of shareholders and statutory rules (see infra notes  
85-86 and accompanying text). 
81 Steven N. Bulloch, “Shareholder Agreements in Closely Held Corporations: Is Sterilization an Issue”,      
Temple Law Quarterly, LIX (1986), pp. 68–71; Wells, note 16 above, at 297-304, 308. 
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of the involved parties.82 However, gradually the attitude of the courts towards the needs     
of close corporations changed, and by the mid of the twentieth century stockholders of     
close corporations got more opportunities for regulating internal corporate relations by 
private agreements.83 At the final stage corporate statutes were changed to acknowledge     
the special features of close corporations.84 
New statutory rules on close corporations allowed their participants to depart from       
the rules by providing for special internal governance rules in shareholder agreements.         
In other words, the nature of statutory corporate rules has been changed. While listed 
companies are subject to mandatory rules, more enabling rules have been introduced for 
close corporations. In particular, the Revised Model Business Corporation Act provides         
in section 7.32(a) that an agreement among the stockholders of a corporation is effective 
among the stockholders and corporation “even though it is inconsistent with one or more        
other provisions of this Act”. Later the act lists several important limitations illustrating that 
section 7.32 does not imply prevalence of the provisions of shareholder agreements over     
the provisions of the act. These limitations are: 
1. the agreement should be included either in the articles of incorporation or by-laws           
of a corporation and approved by its all stockholders, or in a unanimous shareholder 
agreement; 
2. the agreement should be subject to amendment only by all stockholders, unless   
otherwise provided in the agreement; 
3. the agreement should be valid for 10 years, unless it provides otherwise; and 
4. the agreement is available only for closely-held corporations.85 
Official comments to the Model Act further clarify that 
“[s]ection 7.32 is not intended to establish or legitimize an alternative form of 
corporation. Instead, it is intended to add, within the context of the traditional 
corporate structure, legal certainty to shareholder agreements that embody various 
aspects of the business arrangement established by the shareholders to meet their 
business and personal needs. … Section 7.32 also recognizes that many of the 
corporate norms contained in the Model Act, as well as the corporation statutes      
of most states, were designed with an eye towards public companies, where 
management and share ownership are quite distinct. … These functions are often 
conjoined in the close corporation. Thus, section 7.32 validates for nonpublic 
corporations various types of agreements among shareholders even when the 
agreements are inconsistent with the statutory norms contained in the Act.”86 
 
                                                        
82 Wells, note 16 above, at 285-9, 292 (describing the leading case of Jackson v Hooper, where the Court of Errors 
and Appeals of New Jersey struck down the agreement between the shareholders on account of contradictions 
with statutory provisions, especially with the rules ensuring the independence of board members). 
83 Id., 304. 
84 Id., 312-314. 
85 Revised Model Business Corporation Act, section 7.32(b) and (d). 
86 Model Business Corporation Act: Official Text with Official Comments and Statutory Cross-References Revised   
through June 2005 (2005), 7-72–7-73. 
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Therefore, given the fact that the Model Act offers rules for both listed and non-listed 
corporations, section 7.32(a) can be interpreted as acknowledging the enabling nature of     
the provisions of the act with regard to non-listed close corporations, rather than granting 
prevalence to shareholder agreements over imperative statutory rules. 
In Russia, after the 2008 changes, the Law on Limited Responsibility Societies provides 
more flexibility to the members of limited responsibility societies.87 Shareholders of limited 
responsibility societies enjoy more autonomy as compared to both the old regime and the 
statutory rules on joint-stock societies in matters such as voting rights, procedures for 
convening and holding general meetings, the distribution of powers between corporate 
bodies – general meeting of members, board of directors and management. Therefore, 
shareholder agreements in limited responsibility societies provide more opportunity            
for private autonomy. This development, although moderate, is a step in the direction           
of applying different levels of flexibility in business forms based on the level of their 
engagement with external financing and the sophistication of the involved parties. At the 
same time, neither the changes in the Law on Joint-Stock Societies, nor the changes in the  
Law on Limited Responsibility Societies were accompanied by a systematic revision of 
statutory provisions with regard to their nature – should they continue to be imperative, or 
does the extent of the underlying conflicts allow providing to the end users of the business 
forms opt-out or opt-in menus? 
Legal Certainty and Network Effects 
Many aspects of shareholder agreements in the United Kingdom have been developed     
from case law. The abstract wording of Article 32.1 and Article 8(3) of the Russian Federal 
Law on Joint-Stock Societies and the Federal Law on Limited Responsibility Societies 
respectively attribute an important role to court practice as well. However, this practice      
has yet to develop. The introduction of new legal institutions and rules always encounters  
the potential drawback of being a relatively untested phenomenon that has not generated      
a large body of case law and academic research.88 Apparently, legal certainty matters for 
private actors. In particular, the scholarly literature on regulatory competition imparts an 
important role to a well-developed stable case law for attracting companies.89 
Additionally, network externalities – the present value of future judicial decisions 
interpreting legal rules – play an important self-reinforcing role for maintaining leading 
positions  for  a  jurisdiction (rule)  that is popular  among  the users. By  adopting  a rule  that     
                                                        
87 Brief description of the amendments is provided in Dmytri Stepanov, «Реформа законодательства                
об ООО: к принципу свободы договора в корпоративном праве» (Часть I) [Reform of Legislation                 
on Limited Responsibility Societies: Toward the Principle of Freedom of Contract in Corporate Law,                
Part I], Корпоративный юрист [Corporate Jurist], no. 6 (2009), pp. 13-19; Dmytri Stepanov, «Реформа 
законодательства об ООО: к принципу свободы договора в корпоративном праве» (Часть II) [Reform of 
Legislation on Limited Responsibility Societies: Toward the Principle of Freedom of Contract in Corporate Law, 
Part II], Корпоративный юрист [Corporate Jurist], no. 7 (2009), pp. 4-11. 
88 Francisco Reyes and Erik P.M. Vermeulen, “Company Law, Lawyers and ‘Legal’ Innovation: Common       
Law versus Civil Law”, Lex Research Topics in Corporate Law & Economics Working Paper no. 2011-3 (2011),   
9 (available at <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3) (discussing legal uncertainty issues related with the introduction    
of new “hybrid business forms”). 
89 Roberta Romano, “Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle”, Journal of Law, Economics,     
and Organization, I (1985), pp. 250-251, 274, 280-281; Roberta Romano, The Genius of American Corporate Law 
(1993), pp. 39-40. 
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has already been adopted or will be adopted by a large number of other users, a user           
can obtain the benefit of future judicial interpretations of the rule. More applications              
of a rule produce a steady stream of case law that addresses relevant issues in a timely 
fashion. This, in its turn, attracts even more private actors that are willing to use the rule. 
Similar contribution of network externalities strengthens the quality of judiciary and legal 
services.90 
Hence, legal certainty – resulting from well-established English case law – and network 
externalities – the result of larger number of shareholder agreements governed by English 
law as compared to Russian law – offer competitive advantages for and further strengthen 
the position of English law as the applicable law of shareholder agreements. The recent 
Russian rules on shareholder agreements so far have only the backing of the predictions       
of legal scholars. 
Quality of the Judiciary 
The literature on regulatory competition points to the important role of the judiciary in 
ensuring a competitive advantage for a particular jurisdiction. In particular, Bebchuk          
and Hamdani list Delaware’s Chancery Court – which delivers judgments expeditiously    
and has developed specialized expertise – among one of the important advantages of 
Delaware in attracting company incorporations.91 A similar argument is made by Kahan    
and Kamar.92 An empirical investigation of corporate incorporations in American states by 
Kahan found significant evidence that companies are more likely to incorporate in states 
which offer flexible rules with regard to governance of companies and which have higher 
quality judicial systems.93 
The Rule of Law Index is one of the few available projects that compares judiciaries in          
a wide range of jurisdictions. The Rule of Law Index 2011 includes data on 66 countries, 
including the courts of the United Kingdom and Russia. Although with limitations, this  
index demonstrates the significant advantages of United Kingdom courts in almost all 
variables related to civil justice and civil procedure in relation to Russian courts – due  
process of law, judicial corruption, improper government influence on courts, and effective 
enforcement of judgments. The courts of the two jurisdictions come closer only with regard  
to unreasonable delays in courts, yet United Kingdom courts still perform better.94 
The second available index for comparing courts in different jurisdictions is the Lex  
Mundi project. The project provides data on procedural formalism and the time needed         
to  obtain  and enforce  judgments  on  basic  disputes  (eviction  of  a tenant  for  nonpayment          
                                                        
90 Michael Klausner, “Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts”, Virginia Law Review, LXXXI 
(1995), pp. 779, 843-847 (explaining the success of Delaware in charter competition by network effects: more 
companies in Delaware increase case law, and thus make it more predictable); Romano, note 89 above, at 44.  
See also Brett H. McDonnell, “Two Cheers for Corporate Law Federalism”, Journal of Corporation Law, XXX 
(2004), p. 104. 
91 Lucian Arye Bebchuk and Assaf Hamdani, “Vigorous Race or Leisurely Walk: Reconsidering the   
Competition Over Corporate Charters”, Yale Law Journal, CXII (2002), pp. 588-589. 
92 Marcel Kahan and Ehud Kamar, “The Myth of State Competition in Corporate Law”, Stanford Law Review,    
LV (2002), pp. 725-726 (the specialized court is part of Delaware’s competitive advantage). 
93 Marcel Kahan, “The Demand for Corporate Law: Statutory Flexibility, Judicial Quality, or Takeover 
Protection?”,Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, XXII (2006), pp. 352-357. 
94 Mark D. Agrast, Juan C. Botero, and Alejandro Ponce, WJP Rule of Law Index 2011 (2011), pp. 90, 102. 
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of rent and collection of money) in the courts of 109 countries. Although the speed of 
delivering judgments and formal procedural rules offer limited arguments for making 
suggestions about the quality of court systems, the data again confirms the advantages          
of the United Kingdom judiciary. In Russia the eviction of a tenant is expected to take         
130 days, and money collection requires 160 days. Pursuing the same claims in United 
Kingdom courts is expected to take 115 and 101 days respectively. Court proceedings in      
the United Kingdom are also less formalized.95 
By choosing foreign law as the applicable law of shareholder agreements, the parties 
usually opt for foreign courts or international arbitration institutions as the forums for the 
resolution of their disputes. Thus, the quality of Russian courts can explain the choice of 
English law as well. 
Interactions with Contract Law 
The controversial restrictive practice of Russian courts on conditional provisions in    
contracts can be an important reason for avoiding the application of Russian law.  
Conditional clauses are important both for the main obligations of shareholder agreements 
(because many buy-sell clauses are conditional upon certain events), and for the specific 
mechanisms of their enforcement (default event clauses). 
Article 32.1(1) of the Law on Joint-Stock Societies and Article 8(3) of the Law on      
Limited Responsibility Societies provide that stockholder (shareholder) agreements can 
contain provisions on transactions with the stocks or shares: selling shares at a predefined 
price and/or upon the occurrence of a certain event. Can the conditions in an agreement       
be controlled by the parties (such as selling shares at the demand of the other party      
without any indication of the reasons), or should the conditions be out of their control     
(such as share price changes, financial crisis, other)? Russian arbitrazh courts have        
wrongly developed a formal interpretation of the term “certain undefined events”96 and 
refuse to consider as a condition any future event that depends on the will of one of the 
parties. According to Russian judicial practice, conditions cannot be actions or failure to      
act of the parties to an agreement. Rather they are unpredictable external circumstances  
(non-)occurrence of which does not depend on the will of the parties.97 This renders the 
provisions of shareholder agreements on buy-sell options and a default events invalid, and 
thus significantly limits the scope and effectiveness of shareholder agreements. 
English contract law allows for contingent conditions to bind a party (condition 
precedent) or to determine the obligations thereof (condition subsequent), depending on 
actions or will of the other party.98 For example, a condition in a contract may provide that 
                                                        
95 Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer, “Courts”, Quarterly   
Journal of Economics, CXVIII (2003), pp. 478-489, 494-500. 
96 Article 157(1) and (2), Civil Code of the Russian Federation (“1. A transaction shall be considered to be concluded 
under a condition subsequent if the parties have made the arising of rights and duties dependent upon a circumstance 
relative to which it is unknown whether this will ensue or not. 2. A transaction shall be considered to be concluded under   
a condition precedent if the parties have made the termination of rights and duties dependent upon a circumstance relative 
to which it is unknown whether it will ensue or not”. W. E. Butler (transl. & ed.), Civil Code of the Russian Federation 
(2010), p. 67. 
97 For an exhaustive list of references to the judgments of higher arbitrazh courts see Stepanov, note 25 above,     
at 84. 
98 Hugh G. Beale (gen. ed),  Chitty  on   Contracts,  Vol.  1,  General  Principles  (30th ed., 2008),  p.  227,  para.  2-148;   
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the binding obligation of one party to pay allowances to the other party is to come to an     
end if the latter party marries. 
A similar approach is applied throughout Europe and is recommended in the Principles 
of European Contract Law.99 Conditions that are heavily dependent upon the will of           
one party are a recognized issue. When this dependence is so heavy as to signify a total     
lack of contractual commitment by that party, the contract is invalid. However, “[s]uch 
arbitrary conditions are to be distinguished from valid conditions where one party’s obligation             
is dependent upon the will of another.”100 For example, a seller may be bound to supply raw 
materials to a buyer at a stated price in the event of the buyer deciding to accept an offer      
by a third person to purchase goods specially manufactured by the buyer. 
Conditional terms in shareholder agreements are clear examples, falling within the 
second valid category of conditions. It is noteworthy that the Principles of European  
Contract Law, similar to Russian Civil Code, recognize that conditions in contracts must 
relate to “uncertain future events”. Yet, nothing prevents the enforcement of the obligations    
of a party after the occurrence of certain events dependent on the will of the other party 
(rather than on the arbitrary own will). 
Differences in statutory and judicial interpretation of other contractual arrangements 
between the two jurisdictions may have important implications for the choice of applicable 
law too. One example is restrictive covenants in shareholder agreements – such as non-
competition and non-solicitation covenants. In Dawnay Day & Co. Ltd and Another v D’Alphen 
and Others the High Court and the Court of Appeal enforced the restrictive covenants 
included in the shareholder agreement as a reasonable restraint of trade. Usually such 
covenants are enforced in the context of business sale/purchase cases – in order to protect   
the proprietary interest of a buyer in the goodwill of the business – and in employment 
relations. However, the High Court ruled that an investment too is a legitimate proprietary 
interest to protect by a restrictive covenant not to compete, if parties are joining together to 
participate in a venture.101 Therefore, the covenant can also “bite” in cases when shares are 
not disposed. The appellate court went even further by indicating that “the covenant may be 
enforced when the covenantee has a legitimate interest, of whatever kind, to protect, and when           
the covenant is no wider than is necessary to protect that interest.”102 
In Russian corporate practice anecdotal evidence suggests that non-competition       
clauses are usually submitted to the Federal Antimonopoly Service for a prior approval. 
However, in court practice non-competition covenants have never been enforced, and       
thus are surrounded by uncertainty, especially with regard to their compatibility with the 
rights to work, to free choice of employment, to free enterprise, and with the provisions of 
competition law. 
The position of Russian legislation and court practice on penalty clauses is often blamed 
for the shift to foreign law as the applicable law of shareholder agreements. In particular,    
the Russian Civil Code entitles courts to reduce the amount of a contractual penalty if it         
                                                                                                                                               
Edwin Peel, Treitel on the Law of Contract (12th ed., 2007), pp. 67-8, para. 2-110. 
99 Ole Lando and Hugh Beale (eds), The Principles of European Contract Law, Part I: Performance, Non-Performance 
and Remedies (2000), pp. 229-233. 
100 Ibid., 230. 
101 [1998] I.C.R. 1068, 1093. 
102 [1998] I.C.R. 1068, 1107. 
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is obviously disproportionate to the consequences of the breach of an obligation.103 This 
subjects penalty clauses to a different regime of treatment with regard to contractual  
freedom, as opposed to other contractual clauses.104 The importance of fully enforceable 
penalty clauses is crucial for the enforcement of shareholder agreements because the      
nature of the obligations of such agreements often makes impossible or ineffective other 
traditional contractual remedies (such as compensation of damages). 
However, the basic principle of English law is that penalty clauses are not allowed           
at all.105 In common law payments for non-performance of obligations are divided into 
penalty and liquidated damages clauses. Penalty clauses are invalid as bargains “in 
terrorem”.106 Such payments can be considered as liquidated damages – and hence, be valid    
– if they are: (1) incorporated into a contract where an accurate and precise prediction of 
damages is not possible; (2) introduced by the parties with the intention of predicting the 
actual amount of the damage; and (3) a reasonable ex ante estimate of the amount of actual 
damage that could follow.107 Broad discretion granted to the courts in deciding whether    
non-performance payments are void penalty clauses or can be enforced as liquidated 
damages intensifies uncertainty among contractual parties and stipulates speculative 
litigation with the aim of declaring the clause invalid.108 
Therefore, the position of English law on penalty clauses does not offer much advantage 
relative to the enforcement of penalty clauses by Russian courts. Moreover, it can be argued 
that current Russian law is more efficient. First, courts in Russia can reduce the amount of 
penalty clauses, but not invalidate the clauses. Second, Article 333 of the Civil Code – by 
referring to “the consequences of a violation of an obligation” as a proxy to determine the 
“obviously disproportionate” amount of a penalty, in effect links penalty clauses with actual 
damages. The difficulty of defining such damages in the context of shareholder agreements 
can make the courts less willing to reduce the amount of penalties in cases related with 
breaking shareholder agreements. Finally, the introduction of the functional equivalent of 
liquidated damages into Russian rules on shareholder agreements(compensation clauses) 
provides parties with an additional remedy of ensuring the specific performance of 
obligations. Yet, in the absence of court practice, doctrinal writings are not unanimous on 
                                                        
103 Article 333, the Civil Code of the Russian Federation. According to the Constitutional Court of the Russian 
Federation, reducing the amount of penalties by the courts is one of the remedies against abuse of right; 
therefore, Article 333 deals with the obligation, rather than with the right, of the court to establish a balance 
between a responsibility measure and the real amount of loss. See Decision of the Constitutional Court of the 
Russian Federation, 21 December 2000, no. 263-O. 
104 In the beginning of 2011 the Supreme Arbitrazh Court of the Russian Federation clarified the rules on 
reducing the amount of a penalty. First, courts may reduce the amount of a penalty only when it is obviously 
disproportionate to the consequences of the breach of a right, and any other circumstances (such as financial 
problems of a debtor or severe economic situation) cannot be considered by courts as such basis. Second, courts 
cannot reduce the amount of a penalty without the claim of a defendant and evidence provided by it, as the 
previous practice of court action on its own motion violated the principle of adversarial procedure. See Decree 
of the Presidium of the Supreme Arbitrazh Court of the Russian Federation, 13 January 2011, No. 11680/10 
(Russian legal system does not apply classic precedent law; however the decisions of the Supreme Arbitrazh 
Court are highly influential and as a rule are observed by lower arbitrazh courts). 
105 For a global perspective on the enforcement of penalty clauses see Ugo Mattei, “The Comparative Law       
and Economics of Penalty Clauses in Contracts”, American Journal of Comparative Law, XLIII (1995), pp. 433-438. 
106 Clydebank Engineering and Shipbuilding Co. Ltd and Others v Don Jose Ramos Yzquierdo Y Castaneda and Others 
[1905] A.C. 6; Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co. Ltd v New Garage and Motor Co. Ltd [1915] A.C. 79, 86. 
107 Mattei, note 105 above, at 435-436. 
108 Ibid., 432, 436. 
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whether clauses regarding compensation can be reviewed by the courts based on Article    
333 of the Civil Code.109 
At the same time, it should be pointed out that the strong enforcement of penalty    
clauses is only one element of an efficient model of contractual penalties. The second   
element is the clearness and certainty of the position of courts on their enforcement.110 And 
here – notwithstanding the broad discretion English courts enjoy in enforcing liquidated 
damages clauses – the wealth of case law, and standardized practice of shareholder 
agreements in English law might have advantages for drafting and enforcing shareholder 
agreements. In particular, liquidated damages clauses in the agreements of shareholders 
governed by English law include standard clear indications on the acknowledgement by     
the parties that non-performance sums are liquidated damages and represent a genuine    
pre-estimate of the loss, that they are not intended as a penalty to compel performance,      
and the amount of the liquidated damages is not disproportionate to the likely actual loss. 
Role of Supplementary Mechanisms 
English law offers other supplementary mechanisms that allow strengthening the 
effectiveness of shareholder agreements. For instance, voting agreements are strengthened  
by granting irrevocable proxies to one of the parties to the agreement or to an independent 
person. The latter votes for all shareholders who granted the proxy according to the 
provisions of the agreement, whereas the shareholders themselves waive their right to     
vote. Although English law is stricter on irrevocable proxies to vote shares compared to 
United States law,111 the use of irrevocable powers of attorney to vote shares is practiced in 
shareholder agreements governed by English law. 
The closest functional equivalent of such proxies in Russian law is a power of attorney. 
However, irrevocable powers of attorney are impossible in Russian law, which makes     
using powers of attorney as a means for strengthening the enforcement of shareholder 
agreements valueless.112 Granting voting rights by the means of creating agency relations 
governed by Russian law is not effective as well due to the same possibility of termination    
at the will of the parties,113 and uncertainty about the possibility of granting voting rights     
by an agency contract in general. 
                                                        
109 Ivanov and Lebedeva, note 25 above, at 53 (claiming that given the difficulty of defining damages under 
shareholder agreements, Article 333 should not be applicable to penalty clauses included in shareholder 
agreements); Korneev and Arutiunian, note 30 above, at 37 and Stepanov, note 25 above, at 89 (for a claim that 
compensation is different than penalty clauses, so it cannot be reduced by the courts). 
110 Mattei, note 105 above, at 432. 
111 In the United States several states amended statutes to limit the possibility of revoking proxies to vote shares, 
which was previously possible inasmuch as the agent may well have no interest of his own to prevent 
revocation (the lack of consideration). For the description of irrevocable proxies to vote shares and their 
differences from classic agency relations in United States law see Deborah A. DeMott, “Irrevocable Proxies”, 
Australian Law Journal, LXXXII (2008), pp. 516-520. In English law the revocation of proxies to vote shares 
remains a problem limiting the value added of using such proxies in shareholder agreements. The only 
reasoning available to prevent revocation probably is the notion of fraud on the other proxy granting 
shareholders. See Francis M.B. Reynolds, Bowstead & Reynolds on Agency (18th ed., 2006), p. 614, para. 10-013. 
112 Article 188(1)(2), Civil Code of the Russian Federation (the power of attorney ceases to be effective after its 
revocation by the person who issued it). 
113 Article 1010, Civil Code of the Russian Federation (termination of an agency contract by the withdrawal        
of one of the parties). 
The Enforcement of Shareholder Agreements under English and Russian Law 
 
140 JCL 7:1 
 
 
Rise of Anglo-American Law Firm and the Interests of Corporate Lawyers 
In a study of transnational law practice Abel pointed to the dominance of common law 
lawyers arising from the prevalence of large United States and United Kingdom law firms.   
In the early 1990s American law firms accounted for seven of the ten largest firms in the 
world and 25 of the 40 largest firms. Even within Europe 25 of the 30 largest firms were 
British.114 In the following two decades this leadership strengthened even further. The       
2011 Global 100 ranking of law firms compiled by the American Lawyer shows that 78 of        
the top law firms by revenue are American, 12 are British, six are from Australia, and the 
remaining four are from Canada, France, Spain and the Netherlands. United States and 
United Kingdom firms also dominate the ranking of the top 100 global law firms by the 
number of lawyers: 69 American law firms, 16 British, six Australian, three Canadian, three 
French, two Spanish, and one Dutch firm.115 
There are several rankings of law firms in Russia. The rankings of Chambers Global and  
the Legal 500 focus on large international law firms. In particular, in the last ranking of the 
Legal 500 in the field of corporate law and M&A (Moscow) out of 28 law firms 24 are local 
offices of United States and United Kingdom law firms. Only two Russian law firms are 
included in the list.116 The ranking compiled by PRAVO.ru is ignored by some large foreign 
law firms, and thus is biased too. However, the ranking for 2011 still names three United 
Kingdom, three United States and one Canadian firm in the top 17 law firms in the field        
of corporate law and M&A.117 Best Lawyers prepares its own and probably more balanced 
ranking of law firms in Russia. In the 2012 survey results of Best Lawyers the list of law     
firms in the field of corporate law is dominated by foreigners: 25 foreign and 12 Russian     
law firms. The vast majority of foreign law firms are American and British.118 
Common law lawyers, if involved in transactions, naturally prefer to use common law    
as the applicable law. Therefore, the data on law firms in Russia can explain the popularity   
of English law as the governing law of shareholder agreements, and the inclusion of 
standardized Western-style clauses and provisions in the shareholder agreements of    
Russian companies. Law firms with a United Kingdom origin probably tend to offer          
their clients the law with which they are familiar and around which they created their 
networks of knowledge (court interpretations, standardized templates and clauses, other). 
The opposite situation, when the demand for English law has resulted in the increase in      
the number of foreign law firms, is also likely. This scenario, however, is more realistic in 
situations when one of the contractual parties is a foreigner interested in the application        
of neutral or more familiar English law, rather than Russian law. As this is not always the 
case, the causal link between the demand for English law and the resulting increase in the 
number of United Kingdom law firms should be approached carefully. 
The influence of foreign law firms can play a certain role in the application of foreign   
law, and in particular English law, also in another way. The introduction by Anglo-  
American law firms of the  initial  practice of  drafting the  shareholder agreements of Russian  
                                                        
114 Richard L. Abel, “Transnational Law Practice”, Case Western Reserve Law Review, XLIV (1994), p. 741. 
115 The American Lawyer, “The 2011 Global 100”, 28 September 2011. 
116 Available at <http://www.legal500.com/c/russia/corporate-and-manda/moscow> (last visited on 24 June  
2012). 
117 Available at <http://pravo.ru/stat/rating2011_results/corporate_law/> (last visited on 24 June 2012). 
118 Philip Sterkin, «Иностранцев не обойти» [Hard to Avoid Foreigners], Ведомости [Gazette], 23 April 2012. 
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companies according to English law led during the subsequent years to the development      
of a network of knowledge around these agreements. Reyes and Vermeulen describe the  
risk-averse conservative behavior of corporate lawyers with regard to using new business 
forms. Three main reasons lead to the “wait-and-see” strategy of corporate lawyers: (1) a 
network of court cases, legal opinions, standardized documents and other legal materials 
have usually been created around existing legal institutions and rules, providing corporate 
lawyers with a feeling of alleged legal certainty and comfort; (2) lawyers have usually 
invested considerable resources in existing institutions (rules) and their networks, whereas 
the development of new networks requires additional resources and costs, which can also 
benefit other free-riding lawyers; (3) the promotion of new legal innovative products could 
damage the professional reputation of lawyers, if it is successfully challenged in court.119    
The same factors suggest that the professional consultants of Russian private actors might 
have weak incentives to shift to the recent Russian rules on shareholder agreements. 
English Language as Lingua Franca of Foreign Investors and Shareholders 
Scholarly literature indicates the growing “Americanization” of international legal       
culture. The important role of the English language as a lingua franca is evident in both     
legal education and in legal practice.120 Heringa describes the increasing role of English 
(“Euro-English”) in European law schools.121 English is dominant in international business 
transactions and in transnational lawyering.122 
Anglo-American law firms and the English language mutually reinforce each             
other. The growth of Anglo-American law firms fosters the dominance of English, and        
the dominance of English language encourages more clients to seek Anglo-American 
counsel.123 This, in turn, contributes to the prevalence of United States and English law and 
contracting techniques. Reyes argues that the establishment of English as the new lingua 
franca is probably the single most significant factor for the propagation of the common law 
institutions in the world.124 
Therefore, it is reasonable to expect the use of the English language – and probably also 
English law as an applicable law – in the shareholder agreements of Russian companies 
where one or more parties are foreign investors. 
 
                                                        
119 Reyes and Vermeulen, note 88 above, at 27. 
120 Peter L. Murray and Jens Drolshammer, “The Education and Training of a New International Lawyer”, 
European Journal of Law Reform, II (2000), p. 542 (pointing to the important role of the English language in 
commercial contracting, foreign legal education, and foreign legal professions). 
121 Aalt Willem Heringa, “European Legal Education: The Maastricht Experience”, Penn State International Law 
Review, XXIX (2010), pp. 86-88. 
122 Lawrence M. Friedman, “Erewhon: The Coming Global Legal Order”, Stanford Journal of International         
Law, XXXVII (2001), pp. 347-364, at 355; Filip De Ly, “Law and Practice of Drafting International Contracts”, 
International Business Law Journal, no. 3/4(2002), pp. 469-472. 
123 Roger P. Alford, “The American Influence on International Arbitration”, Ohio State Journal of Dispute 
Resolution, XIX (2003), pp. 86-87. 
124 Francisco Reyes, “Corporate Governance in Latin America: A Functional Analysis”, University of Miami    
Inter-American Law Review, XXXIX (2008), p. 213. 
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Tradition of Referring to English Law in Commercial Contracts 
The study of the choice of substantive law in commercial contracts disputed in international 
arbitration institutions shows that English, Swiss, and French law were the most commonly 
chosen applicable law of the agreements in 2003 (24%, 20%, and 19% respectively).125 
Adjusted to the country of origin of the parties involved in disputes, English law is chosen 
5.35 times more often than that was to be expected.126 
These data illustrate that in agreements involving parties from different countries there   
is a tradition of referring to English law as the substantive applicable law. There are no  
strong reasons to believe that shareholder agreements are completely different from other 
commercial agreements. Therefore, it is reasonable to expect the shareholder agreements      
of Russian companies to be governed by English law (or other foreign law), if at least one     
of the parties of the agreement is a foreign investor. 
TOWARDS A MODEL FOR INTERPRETING RULES ON SHAREHOLDER 
AGREEMENTS BY RUSSIAN COURTS 
In effect shareholder agreements (and especially voting agreements) can set restrictions        
on the expectations (rights) of shareholders that are based on statutory rules and the 
provisions of the articles of association (e.g. caps on the size of dividends or agreed voting 
against the payment of dividends). These provisions actually can change statutory rules     
and the provisions of the articles of association, although not formally. This justifies the 
careful approach of courts in different jurisdictions towards the enforcement of shareholder 
agreements. 
Because shareholder agreements allow for the opting out from statutory provisions,    
their enforcement is directly related to one of the basic issues of corporate law – the debate  
on the structure of corporate law (imperative versus enabling). Within this debate Bebchuk 
offered an analytical framework that distinguishes opting out from corporate rules in the 
initial stage of the company by-law approval and opting out in the midstream stage (at       
the charter amendment stage).127 The suggestion is justified given significantly different 
effects of opting out at the two different stages for parties by reason of decision-making 
procedures – unanimous agreement at the initial stage, and majority voting at the stage of 
altering articles of association. 
The framework implies that in a situation when all shareholders are participating             
in the agreement, provisions that in fact restrict the rights of shareholders do not create 
significant conflicts. Moreover, the use of a contractual mechanism that requires unanimity 
for amendments (whatever the size of a shareholding is) offers better protection than the 
introduction of the changes through the articles of association, because in the latter case          
                                                        
125 Stefan Voigt, “Are International Merchants Stupid? Their Choice of Law Sheds Doubt on the Legal Origin 
Theory”, Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, V (2008), p. 12. The data relates only to the International Court of 
Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce in Paris. This, indeed, might imply some bias towards 
French law, although the study considers this counterargument with regard to the figures “not convincing”. 
However, for the purposes of this study this “bias” is not relevant. Otherwise, if this is true, the significance of 
English law in international transactions should be even higher. 
126 Ibid., 15. 
127 Lucian Arye Bebchuk, “Limiting Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law: The Desirable Constraints on 
Charter Amendments”, Harvard Law Review, CII (1989), pp. 1820-1860. 
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a 75% majority voting requirement, as a rule, is sufficient for amending resolutions to be 
passed.128 The important issue of unanimity in shareholder agreements was first mentioned  
in the judgment of the Court of Appeals of New York in Manson v Curtis: 
“The rule that all the stockholders by their universal consent may do as they choose with the 
corporate concerns and assets, provided the interests of creditors are not affected,        
because they are the complete owners of the corporation, cannot not be invoked here.”129 
Although the case did not involve a unanimous stockholder agreement, the judgment 
pointed out that the factor of unanimity, as well as external factors (the interests of   
creditors), are important in deciding on the enforcement of stockholder agreements.               
In Clark v Dodge the court for the first time approved a stockholder agreement mainly      
based on unanimity considerations.130 Currently, unanimous shareholder agreements are 
strongly enforced outside the United States.131 
More controversial is the case when a shareholder agreement with similar effect on 
statutory rules and the articles of association involves only the majority of shareholders. 
While such agreement creates reasonable expectations for its parties, it in fact suppresses    
the reasonable expectations of non-participating shareholders deriving from the articles        
of association, as the latter do not participate in decision-making, while the former would   
not always take into account the effects of their agreements on third parties. To mitigate      
the conflict arising out of significant externalities for non-participating shareholders and to 
correct information asymmetries, English law requires the disclosure of such shareholder 
agreements, as, in effect, shareholder agreements materially change the company’s 
governance and serve as its articles of association. This measure is efficient and effective for 
future shareholders, as they can obtain information and make informed decisions about 
buying shares.132 But the disclosure requirement offers only limited protection for the   
                                                        
128 Both United Kingdom and Russian law require 75% majority voting for the alterations of the articles of 
association (Companies Act 2006, section 21 (amendment of articles) and section 282 (special resolutions); Law 
on Joint-Stock Societies, Article 49(4)). In Russian limited responsibility societies the minimum threshold for the 
approval of the alterations is set at the level of 2/3 of the votes (Law on Limited Responsibility Societies, Article 
37(8).). It should be noted that both jurisdictions offer remedies for non-consenting shareholders in the cases     
of the alterations of the articles. See Companies Act 2006, sections 994–996 (protection of shareholders against 
unfair prejudice); the Law on Joint-Stock Societies, Article 75(1) and Article 76(5) (the protection offered by 
Russian legislation is limited; the law imposes a cap on the maximum amount that can be spent by the company 
for buying back the shares of non-consenting shareholders). 
129 119 N.E. 559, 562-3 (N.Y. 1918). 
130 119 N.E. 641, 642 (N.Y. 1936) (another important consideration was the absence of a damage to third  
persons). 
131 For the United Kingdom see above, notes 55-57, and accompanying text. For Canada see Richard James Hay 
and Lucinda Ann Smith, “The Unanimous Shareholder Agreement: A New Device for Shareholder Control”, 
Canadian Business Law Journal, X (1985), pp. 440-462. In Germany the Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof) 
has developed similar position with regard to the unanimous agreements of the members of Gesellschaft mit 
beschränkter Haftung – if there is one shareholder agreement among all shareholders, then a breach of the 
agreement can serve as a ground for the invalidation of the decision of the general meeting of shareholders 
(BGH NJW 1983, 1910, 1911 and BGH NJW 1987, 1890, 1892.). 
132 Ferran argues that there are no risks for future minority shareholders, even when contractual covenants      
are not disclosed. Ex post remedies of petitioning the court for relief from unfairly prejudicial conduct (non-
disclosure of important agreements before selling shares is considered as such conduct) proved to be effective. 
See Ferran, note 42 above, at 363. However, ex post enforcement can create additional costs. Usually share 
purchase agreements contain other substitute contractual techniques that can protect future shareholders (such 
as representations and warranties of a seller). 
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current shareholders who do not participate in the agreement, yet have to make changes       
in their initial expectations with regard to their investments in the company’s shares. 
Russian law does not require the disclosure of shareholder agreements in such cases.133 
However, the Civil Code offers a remedy to strike down the agreements in such cases by 
referring to the abstract concept of abuse of rights.134 While deciding on the validity of the 
agreement, the efficiency standard requires courts to consider three important factors that 
affect the scope of conflicting interests with regard to shareholder agreements: 
(1) the coverage of the agreement – all shareholders or only part; 
(2) the status of a company/type of a business form – apparently, in listed companies it          
is practically impossible to involve all the stockholders in a stockholder agreement.   
While in such cases the interests of non-participating minority stockholders require 
special protection, in non-listed companies private contracting plays greater role in 
practice, and can serve better the interests of the involved parties; 
(3) the existence of a possible public disclosure of the agreement – with introducing the 
distinction between existing and new shareholders if necessary. 
The changes to the Law on Limited Responsibility Societies took into account the 
important factor of unanimous decision-making, although in a context not directly        
related to shareholder agreements. In particular, different aspects of preemptive and first 
refusal rights of buying shares – buying shares by a price pre-determined in the articles, 
including the changes of the price and a mechanism for its definition, buying or offering 
shares in non-proportionate amounts with regard to the existing shareholdings – shall          
be established either at the initial stage of incorporating a limited liability society or by a 
unanimous decision of shareholders at later stages.135 The courts can extend the framework 
considered by the legislature to interpret the effects of the provisions of shareholder 
agreements on corporate resolutions – unanimous agreements in effect have a status of           
a company’s constitution. Although this factor is also important for defining the limits of 
private autonomy in shareholder agreements, it is hardly possible that the courts can rely    
on it without the backing of express legislative action. 
The same changes provide some evidence that the legislature has made the first steps      
in the direction of substantively separating statutory regimes of limited responsibility 
societies and joint-stock societies based on the autonomy of their members. Unlike joint-  
stock societies, the principle of contractual freedom has wider application in limited 
responsibility societies. Thus, if the courts apply this approach of differentiated treatment,  
the same provisions that might be invalidated in the agreements of the stockholders of     
joint-stock societies may be enforced in the shareholder agreements of participants of   
                                                        
133 The Federal Antimonopoly Service of Russia has proposed regulatory changes that require the disclosure      
of shareholder agreements. However the aim of the disclosure requirement is completely different – control     
by the agency over compliance with antimonopoly legislation by companies. This indeed will affect the scope   
of disclosure, because in order to achieve the aim all shareholder agreements, at least in companies with large 
market shares, should be disclosed. See Catherine Belton, “Russian Agency Proposes Changes to End BP Stand-
off with AAR”, Financial Times, 7 June 2012. 
134 Article 10(1), Civil Code of the Russian Federation (“The actions of citizens and juridical persons effectuated 
exclusively with the intention to cause harm to another person, and also abuse of right in other forms, shall not be 
permitted”. Butler, Civil Code of the Russian Federation (2010), p. 6. 
135 Law on Limited Responsibility Societies, Article 21(4) paras 4-6. 
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limited responsibility societies.136 The approach will be further boosted by the proposal         
to introduce the division of business forms into public (listed) and non-public (non-listed) 
entities at the legislative level.137 
The draft law reforming civil legislation contains other proposals that are essential for   
the enforcement of shareholder agreements. In particular, the proposals include changes to 
penalty clauses,138 conditional provisions in agreements,139 and powers of attorney.140 The 
draft law, if adopted, will also clarify the relations between the provisions of shareholder 
agreements and charters. Draft Article 67.2(6) provides that the parties to a shareholder 
agreement cannot claim invalidity of the agreement by virtue of its being contrary to the 
charter of the society. As the comparative analysis shows, this provision should not be 
interpreted as a declaration of the prevalence of the provisions of shareholder agreements 
over charter provisions. The only justified implication of the provision is that in the cases      
of contradictions between the two documents, the actions of shareholders consistent with   
the articles are valid, yet they breach their contractual obligations. Hence, the defaulting 
contractual party can be held liable to pay damages, or contractual penalties, or perform 
other actions according to the shareholder agreement. 
The comparative analysis shows that in some cases the changes are needed to alter 
existing court practice rather than being the result of the flaws in the texts of the current 
statutory provisions. In some cases the changes are quite detailed, which can be explained 
with the aim of ensuring legal certainty for the involved parties in the absence of extensive 
court practice. Here the interests of the legislature and Russian law firms interestingly 
overlap. Apparently, the wish to “return” the commercial transactions of Russian private 
actors into the domain of Russian law is strong enough to prevent the legislature from 
adopting the strategy of waiting for the changes in court practice. At the same time, the  
factor of using foreign law and “national sovereignty” concerns might be leveraged by 
different lobbying groups of practicing lawyers to promote changes in the legislation    
instead of pursuing a risky strategy of attempting and changing court practice. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The comparative analysis shows that the issues of the enforcement of shareholder  
agreements encountered by private actors in Russia are not unique and country-specific.    
The questions of relations between the provisions of shareholder agreements, on one hand, 
and imperative statutory rules and company charter, on the other hand, the participation      
of the company and third persons in the shareholder agreement, the specific performance     
of shareholder agreements, and the effects of shareholder agreements on corporate acts      
and  non-participating  parties  generate  much debate  and encounter problems in the United  
 
                                                        
136 Stepanov, note 25 above, at 70-71. 
137 Draft Federal Law of the Russian Federation No. 47538-6 Amending the First, Second, Third and Fourth   
Parts of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation and Other Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation, No. 
47538-6, Article 66.3 (available in Russian at http://asozd2.duma.gov.ru/. 
138 Limiting significantly the possibility of the reduction of the amount of penalties by the courts in commercial 
agreements. 
139 Allowing conditional provisions to depend on the will of a contractual party. 
140 Introducing irrevocable proxies for entrepreneurs. 
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Kingdom as well. The analysis also shows that the rules on shareholder agreements should  
be examined within the general framework of corporate and contract law. 
These conclusions allow other explanations to be suggested for the popularity of English 
law as the applicable law of shareholder agreements entered into by Russian private actors 
rather than to blame the “wrong” concept of stockholder (shareholder) agreements offered  
by the Law on Joint-Stock Societies and the Law on Limited Responsibility Societies.    
Among others, the most important explanations seem to be the general imperative         
nature of corporate legislation in Russia, legal uncertainty related with the application           
of the recent statutory provisions on shareholder agreements, quality of Russian courts,      
the “unfavorable” practice of the courts on several contractual concepts crucial for the 
effectiveness of shareholder agreements, the influence of foreign law firms and the interests 
of practicing lawyers. Apparently, in shareholder agreements with foreign investors the 
extensive use of the English language and English law in commercial transactions matters 
too. None of these factors can be claimed to play the sole or the most important role in the 
popularity of English law. Taken together, and probably supported by other factors not 
mentioned here, however, they may explain the choice of private actors. 
The last part of this article uses the results of the comparative study and economic 
reasoning to offer a general model for the interpretation of the provisions of shareholder 
agreements by the courts. The model relies on three elements that should be considered by 
the courts: (non-) unanimity of the agreement, the type of business form, and the disclosure 
of the shareholder agreement. 
The development of judicial practice in line with the offered model of shareholder 
agreements is an important condition for increasing the demand for Russian rules on 
shareholder agreements. This development cannot be achieved without a comprehensive 
reform of Russian corporate law oriented towards the introduction of different levels             
of balance between imperative and enabling rules depending on the type of business      
forms (joint-stock societies versus limited responsibility societies) and the number of         
their stockholders or participants (listed versus non-listed companies). Still, as some 
explanations of the popularity of English law show – network externalities in particular          
– English law will probably maintain its dominance, at least for large investors who can 
afford additional costs related with obtaining advice on foreign law and adjudicating in 
international arbitration and foreign courts. 
The analysis also indicates two directions for prospective research related to shareholder 
agreements in general and with the practice of shareholder agreements in Russia in 
particular. The first direction is related to the economic analysis of shareholder agreements 
and to drawing parallels with takeover rules applicable to listed companies. While law       
and economics analysis of takeover rules is abundant, similar studies of the provisions          
of shareholder agreements are lacking. The second direction of prospective research   
concerns the role of judiciary in regulatory competition. The active role of the Russian 
legislature in drafting and enacting rules intended to create conditions for the enforcement   
of shareholder agreements in Russia suggests that Russian courts are less involved in the 
process of regulatory competition than the legislature, and that comparative law hardly  
plays an important role in the judicial analysis of Russian courts. 
